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This chapter summarizes what is known about the labor supply of older 
American men, deﬁ  ned as those aged 55 years and over. The topic is of 
great interest because in the coming decades older individuals will com-
prise a much greater portion of the U.S. population, so the labor supply 
of older adults will have a signiﬁ  cant impact on national output, tax reve-
nues, and the cost of means-tested programs. Most importantly, a greater 
proportion of older individuals will need to remain in the workforce than 
is the present case, because the retirement income system is contracting 
and working longer is the only way for most people to ensure ﬁ  nancial 
security in their old age. The paper’s focus is on men, because women’s 
work patterns are changing and increasingly reﬂ  ect the work patterns of 
men.
Section I of this paper describes the changes to the U.S. retirement 
income system that will require people to work longer. Section II sum-
marizes the long-term decline in labor force activity among older men 
over the course of the twentieth century, and the factors that contributed 
to this trend. Section III describes the recent turnaround in the labor 
force activity of older Americans, and the changes in Social Security and 
employer-provided pension plans that likely led to that reversal. In an 
attempt to determine whether the labor supply of older workers will 
continue to increase, section IV describes changes in work patterns that 
have emerged in the last 20 years, which have led to more labor market 
mobility and less job tenure among older workers, and the implications 
of such changes on labor supply. Section V addresses how the health of 
older people may inﬂ  uence the extent to which they can be expected to The Labor Supply of Older Americans 84
continue in the labor force, and underscores that for 15 to 20 percent 
of older workers, continued employment will be impossible. Section VI 
discusses the remaining incentives to retire—namely, the availability of 
Social Security beneﬁ  ts at age 62 and the lack of ﬂ  exible employment 
arrangements. Section VII concludes and estimates labor force participa-
tion rates going forward.
I.  The Need for Continued Employment
As people age, earnings become dramatically less important as a source 
of household income, giving way primarily to income from Social Secu-
rity and employer retirement income plans. Today the share of household 
income from earnings declines from 81 percent for those aged 55–61 
years, to 57 percent for those aged 62–64, to 23 percent for those 65–69, 
and becomes trivial thereafter; see Figure 3.1. However, both Social Secu-
rity and employer plans will replace a smaller portion of pre-retirement 
income in the future than is the case today. This is especially clear for 
Figure 3.1 
2005 Earnings as a Percent of Income, U.S. Households Aged 55 Years and 
Older, Middle Quintile



















55 to 61 62 to 64 65 to 69 70 to 74 75 to 79 80 and over
85 Alicia H. Munnell and Steven A. Sass
Social Security, which is a signiﬁ  cant source of income for most retired 
Americans.
The Outlook for Social Security
At any given retirement age, Social Security beneﬁ  ts will replace a smaller 
fraction of pre-retirement earnings in the future. Today, the hypothetical 
“medium earner” retiring at age 65 receives beneﬁ  ts equal to about 41 per-
cent of his or her previous earnings. After paying the Medicare Part B pre-
mium, which is automatically deducted from Social Security beneﬁ  ts before 
the check goes in the mail, the replacement rate is 39 percent. But, under 
current law, Social Security replacement rates—beneﬁ  ts as a percent of pre-
retirement earnings—are scheduled to decline for three reasons. First, the 
program’s Full Retirement Age is currently in the process of moving from 
65 to 67, which is equivalent to an across-the-board cut in beneﬁ  ts.1 Sec-
ond, Medicare Part B premiums are slated to increase sharply due to rising 
healthcare costs.2 (Premiums for the new Part D drug beneﬁ  t will also claim 
an increasing share of the monthly Social Security check.) Finally, Social 
Security beneﬁ  ts will be taxed more under the personal income tax, as the 
exemption amounts are not currently indexed to inﬂ  ation. For the medium 
earner who claims beneﬁ  ts at age 65, these three factors will reduce the net 
replacement rate from 39 percent in 2002 to 30 percent in 2030; see Figure 
3.2. Restoring Social Security’s long-term solvency through more beneﬁ  t 
cuts would reduce this level of support still further. 
The Outlook for Private Sector Employer-Sponsored Pensions
With a diminished role for Social Security in providing retirement income, 
future retirees will be increasingly dependent on employer-sponsored pen-
sion plans. At any moment in time, however, less than half of the private 
sector workforce aged 25 to 64 years participates in an employer-spon-
sored retirement income plan of any type. This fraction has remained 
virtually unchanged since the late 1970s, and is unlikely to improve.3 
Since participation in employer-provided pension plans tends to increase 
with earnings, only middle- and upper-income individuals can count on 
receiving meaningful beneﬁ  ts from these plans.
The other issue is that the nature of pension coverage has changed 
dramatically. Twenty years ago, most American workers with pension The Labor Supply of Older Americans 86
coverage had a traditional deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plan, which pays a lifetime 
annuity at retirement.4 Today the world looks very different, as depicted 
in Figure 3.3. Most people with an employed-sponsored pension have a 
deﬁ  ned contribution plan—typically a 401(k)—and 401(k) plans oper-
ate like savings accounts.5 In theory workers may accumulate substan-
tial pension wealth under 401(k) plans, but in practice they do not. 
For example, simulations suggest that the worker in the middle of the 
earnings distribution, who contributes regularly throughout his or her 
work life, should end up at retirement with about $300,000 in a 401(k) 
account and/or in an Individual Retirement Account (IRA), as most 
IRA assets are rolled-over balances from 401(k) plans. This $300,000, 
when combined with Social Security beneﬁ  ts, would provide an adequate 
retirement income. Yet reality looks quite different. The Federal Reserve 
Board’s 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances reports that the typical indi-
vidual approaching retirement had 401(k)/IRA balances of only $60,000, 
as shown in Figure 3.4.6 Nor do younger cohorts seem to be on track to 
accumulate sufﬁ  cient assets to provide an adequate retirement income. A 
Figure 3.2 
Social Security Replacement Rates for the Medium Earner, 2002 and 2030
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critical factor explaining these low balances is that the entire responsibil-
ity for retirement saving has shifted from the employer to the employee, 
and employees make mistakes at every step along the way.7 
Americans’ Decline in Personal Saving
Given the projected decline in Social Security and the increased uncer-
tainty surrounding employer-sponsored pensions, one might have 
expected to see working age adults increase their personal saving rates. 
This is certainly what the standard life-cycle model predicts. But a recent 
study of the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) found 
that saving by the working-age population has declined, and that virtu-
ally all the saving undertaken by the working-age population occurred 
in employer-sponsored pension plans (Munnell, Golub-Sass, and Varani 
2005). In recent years, the saving rate of the working-age population 
outside of such plans has actually been negative; see Figure 3.5. 
Figure 3.3 
Percent of U.S. Wage and Salary Workers with Pension Coverage by Type of Plan
Source: Munnell and Sundén (2006) based on the U.S. Board of Governors 
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Figure 3.4 
401(k)/IRA Actual and Simulated Accumulations by Age Group, in 2004
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Source: Munnell, Golub-Sass, and Varani (2005).
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Thus, the outlook for retirement income for future cohorts of retirees 
is dismal. People are not going to be able to continue to retire at age 63 
and maintain their standard of living over an increasingly long period 
of retirement; see Figure 3.6. Moreover, dramatically rising healthcare 
costs are going to erode already diminished retirement incomes.8 Work-
ing longer is an obvious solution.9 Each additional year in the workforce 
increases income directly through earnings from work and investments. 
It also actuarially increases Social Security beneﬁ  ts by 7 to 8 percent, 
allows retirement savings more time to accumulate investment earnings, 
and reduces the number of years over which those savings need to be 
spread. The implications are striking. As shown in Figure 3.7, a cou-
ple in the middle of the income distribution that delays retirement from 
62 to 70 would reduce the assets needed to replace 80 percent of their 
after-tax pre-retirement income from $555,000 to $128,000.10 Delaying 
retirement is clearly a powerful lever for addressing the coming decline 
in the nation’s retirement income system. But is it realistic for most 
people?
Figure 3.6 
Expected Years in Retirement for American Men
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Census Bureau (1962–2005), 
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II.  The Long-term Decline in Employment Rates for Older American 
Men
The notion of retirement as a distinct and extended stage of life is a 
twentieth-century innovation. Up to the end of the nineteenth century, 
people generally worked as hard and as long as they could. Men in their 
prime put in 60 hours of work each week. And at the end of life they had 
only about two years of “retirement,” often due to ill health. Productive 
capacity declined with age, as health impairments were much more prev-
alent and jobs much more physically demanding than is the case today. 
So in older age people took on less taxing jobs or worked fewer hours. 
But they generally stopped working only when no longer able.11 
Beginning around the end of the nineteenth century, the percent of 
the older U.S. population that continued to work began to decline. This 
can be seen in Figure 3.8, which shows employment rates by age.12 The 
percent in 1880 to about 40 percent in 1940 to 16 percent in 1990. 
Figure 3.7 
Assets Required for a Married Couple Earning $63,660 After Taxes to Maintain 
80 Percent of After-Tax Pre-Retirement Income in 2007
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Then and now, people retire for three basic reasons. Poor health may 
make it impossible for them to keep working. Physical strength, eyesight, 
hearing, and mental agility decline with age, and the incidence of con-
tracting debilitating conditions and illnesses rises. Second, as the real or 
perceived productivity of older workers ebbs, employers ﬁ  nd it unprof-
itable to employ them. Third, people acquire enough wealth to forgo 
earnings from the labor market. That is, as productivity declines and 
an increased incidence of ailments raises the disutility of work, older 
people with adequate savings can choose to quit the workforce. In terms 
of explaining the trend toward longer periods of retirement, increasing 
personal wealth and the attitudes of employers must be the primary driv-
ers.13 The health of older American adults has improved, not deterio-
rated, and would have been expected to lead to later retirement. 
Economic growth has been dramatic throughout the twentieth century. 
Despite the Great Depression, output per hour in 1940 was 2.7 times the 
Figure 3.8 
Labor Force Participation Rates of American Men Aged 55 to 64 Years, and 65 
Years and Older, 1880–2000
Source: Ruggles and Sobek (2004).
Note: From 1880 to 1930, work rates are defined as reporting any gainful 
occupation. From 1940 to 2000, work rates are labor force participation rates, 
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level in 1880 (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 1973). Workers used 
some of this increased afﬂ  uence to reduce their labor burden. The length 
of the work day fell sharply between the 1880s, when the typical worker 
labored 10 hours a day, 6 days a week, and 1940, when the typical work 
schedule was 8 hours per day, 5 days per week (Costa 2000). But suc-
cessful retirement requires more than rising incomes and a decision to 
consume more leisure. People can retire from the labor force only if they 
have a source of income once their earnings cease. 
In theory, people could save during their working years and then tap 
those assets to support themselves in retirement. But this saving and 
investing process requires a good deal of foresight, discipline, and skill. 
People need to predict their earnings over their lifetime, how long they 
will be able to work, how much they will earn on their assets, and their 
life expectancy. Recent surveys suggest that even today, people are not 
very good at planning for retirement. Moreover, at the turn of the century 
most people had little reason to save for retirement since most died early, 
often in middle age.14
Instead of saving for retirement, an unexpected and substantial income 
stream for the elderly appeared at the end of the nineteenth century in the 
form of old-age pensions provided to the large number of Union Army 
Civil War veterans. A comprehensive study found that veterans eligible 
for these pensions had signiﬁ  cantly higher retirement rates than did the 
American population at large (Costa 1998). It is important to note that 
these pensions did not require workers to retire; beneﬁ  ciaries could col-
lect these payments while remaining employed. That Union Army pen-
sions produced an upsurge in retirements clearly illustrates the “income 
effect” of increased wealth on the labor supply of older workers, who 
often choose to consume a portion of that increased wealth in the form 
of more retirement. 
Labor market participation rates in the United States did not return 
to their previous levels as the Union Army veterans died off in the early 
decades of the twentieth century. After a pause, the percentage of the 
older adult male population in the labor force continued to decline. Vari-
ous analysts have argued that this reﬂ  ects the growth of worker incomes 
(Costa 1998). But employer attitudes were also becoming more impor-
tant. The U.S. workforce was rapidly shifting from self-employment, most 
93 Alicia H. Munnell and Steven A. Sass
notably as farmers, to employment in large enterprises. These organiza-
tions increasingly imposed mandatory retirement requirements on their 
employees, and were reluctant to hire older workers seeking employment 
(Moen 1987; Margo 1993).
The next big decline in the work rates of older American men, and espe-
cially of men aged 55 to 64 years, occurred after World War II, as shown in 
Figure 3.9. One obvious factor was the availability of Social Security ben-
eﬁ  ts. Although the legislation was enacted in 1935, initially only Old Age 
Assistance welfare beneﬁ  ts were paid. Social Security’s retirement beneﬁ  ts 
were not paid until 1941, and then the value of these beneﬁ  ts were seri-
ously eroded by wartime and postwar inﬂ  ation. The critical 1950 Social 
Security Amendments restored replacement rates—Social Security beneﬁ  ts 
relative to pre-retirement earnings—to 30 percent for the average earner. 
In the wake of the 1935 legislation, workers chose to consume a portion of 
their newfound Social Security wealth in the form of more retirement. 
The uptick in retirement was probably also due to key features in the 
program design—the Social Security Retirement Earnings Test and the 
“take-it-or-leave-it” character of Social Security beneﬁ  ts. The earnings 
Figure 3.9 
Labor Force Participation of American Men Aged 55 to 64 Years, and 65 Years 
and Older, 1960–2006
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test meant that workers could not collect beneﬁ  ts if their earnings from 
work were more than a trivial sum. The “take-it-or-leave-it” character 
meant that a worker’s beneﬁ  ts would not rise if he or she delayed claim-
ing. The effective compensation of a worker who did not retire at age 65 
was their compensation less their foregone Social Security beneﬁ  t (and 
taxes and work expenses). Social Security thus decreased the value of 
remaining at work vis-à-vis retirement, and this “substitution effect” 
contributed to the decline in labor force participation. Employer pension 
plans had similar features and similar effects. These plans required that a 
worker retire in order to collect beneﬁ  ts, and offered no increase in ben-
eﬁ  ts if a worker stayed on the job and retired at a later age. 
Ultimately, Social Security’s low level of earnings replacement was 
judged inadequate, given the widespread acceptance of retirement as a 
legitimate period of rest after a lifetime of work, the relative poverty of 
the elderly U.S. population, and the recognition that employer-provided 
pensions would never ﬁ  ll the retirement income gap. In response, Con-
gress enacted Medicare in 1965, and in 1972 sharply increased Social 
Security beneﬁ  ts to roughly a 40 percent earnings replacement rate for 
the benchmark average earner. 
The postwar period also saw the expansion of employer-sponsored pen-
sion plans, driven by three main considerations. First, employer-sponsored 
deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans had become an essential component of corporate 
personnel systems of large-scale organizations in the United States, so 
coverage grew as employment in government and corporate big business 
blossomed in the mid-twentieth century. Second, the special tax treatment 
of employer pensions became signiﬁ  cantly more valuable in the face of 
mass income taxation.15 And third, unions, which had gained powerful 
collective bargaining rights, made pensions a standard component of labor 
agreements throughout the unionized sector by the end of the 1950s. 
By the early 1970s, the combination of Social Security beneﬁ  ts and 
employer-sponsored pension plans provided long-serving workers a 
secure and comfortable retirement income. In the wake of these develop-
ments, the labor force participation rates for men 65 and over declined 
from 33 percent in 1960 to 16 percent in 1985.16 
Two factors, in addition to the sheer increase in retirement wealth cre-
ated by the expansion of the retirement income system, also contributed 
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to a decline in the labor supply of American men in the 55–64 age group. 
First, many traditional employer-deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans began to offer sig-
niﬁ  cant subsidies for workers taking early retirement. The subsidy arises 
because companies offer beneﬁ  ts at an early retirement age, such as 55, 
that are not adjusted sufﬁ  ciently to reﬂ  ect the fact that retirees will receive 
beneﬁ  ts for 10 years longer, and begin collecting earlier, than if they retired 
at age 65.17 The subsidy implicit in the less-than-actuarially fair reduction 
then gradually declines and disappears entirely at the plan’s normal retire-
ment age.18 By decreasing the value of remaining at work vis-à-vis taking 
retirement, this produces a strong incentive to retire early. 
The second factor affecting labor force participation rates for men aged 
55–64 years was the availability of Social Security beneﬁ  ts at age 62. 
When in 1935 Congress established 65 as the age of eligibility for Social 
Security beneﬁ  ts, it was following precedents set internationally and by 
employer-sponsored plans. But in 1956, Congress lowered Social Secu-
rity’s Earliest Eligibility Age (EEA) for women to 62.19 The introduction 
of an EEA for men followed in 1961, primarily in response to a reces-
sion that left many older male workers without employment. These early 
retirement beneﬁ  ts are actuarially adjusted, and thus involve no clear 
increase in retirement wealth. But numerous empirical studies, showing a 
spike in retirements at age 62, support the notion that the availability of 
beneﬁ  ts at 62 was an important factor in reducing the labor force partici-
pation rate of men aged 55–64 years (see Gustman and Steinmeier 1986, 
Rust and Phelan 1997, Burtless and Quinn 2000).20 
III.  The Recent Trend Reversal in Older Men’s Labor Force Participation
The decline in the labor force activity of older American men ended in 
the mid-1980s. As shown in Figure 3.10, which depicts men’s labor force 
participation rates by age for 1940, 1970, 1985, and 2005, labor force 
activity at each age was below that for the earlier period until 1985. 
The pattern then reversed, with older men’s labor force participation rate 
in 2005 above the 1985 level for those 62 and over.21 Observers have 
offered a number of explanations for this change in direction (Friedberg 
2007; Burtless and Quinn 2002). We discuss some of these changes in 
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Changes in the Social Security Program 
Social Security beneﬁ  ts available at any given age have become less gen-
erous, and incentives for early retirement have been reduced or elimi-
nated. 
Two changes enacted in 1983 have reduced beneﬁ  t amounts. First, this 
legislation made up to half of Social Security beneﬁ  ts taxable for people 
with earnings above a certain threshold.22 For higher income beneﬁ  cia-
ries, the taxable percentage was increased to 85 percent in 1994. For 
these higher paid workers, subjecting their Social Security beneﬁ  ts to tax-
ation is equivalent to a beneﬁ  t cut. Second, the 1983 legislation gradually 
increased the Full Retirement Age from 65 to 67, which is equivalent to 
an across-the-board beneﬁ  t cut. Once the increase is fully phased in, for 
cohorts born in 1960 and later, those retiring at age 62 will receive 70 
percent, as opposed to the original 80 percent, of full beneﬁ  ts. 
The expected negative “income effect” of such beneﬁ  t cuts is an increase 
in the labor supply of older Americans, as workers respond to this decline 
Figure 3.10 
Labor Force Participation Rates of American Men Aged 55 Years, and Older, 
1940–2005
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
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in wealth in part by consuming less while working, in part by consuming 
less in retirement, and in part by working more and “consuming” less 
retirement. But the labor-supply effects of these beneﬁ  t cuts mainly lie in 
the future. The Full Retirement Age only began rising for those turning 
62 in 2000, and that year the beneﬁ  t reduction was small.23 The increased 
taxation of beneﬁ  ts will also affect a much larger share of the population 
in the future, as the income thresholds are not indexed for inﬂ  ation. 
The increase in older men’s labor force participation since the mid-
1980s is more likely due to changes in the Social Security program that 
made continued work more attractive vis-à-vis retirement. The ﬁ  rst 
change is the liberalization and, for some, the elimination of the earnings 
test. Since Social Security began as a program insuring workers and their 
dependents against a loss of earnings due to disability, old age, or death, 
the government imposed an earnings test: beneﬁ  ts were paid only if earn-
ings were “lost.” This test, however, encouraged workers to retire early, 
because it seemed like a tax. Most workers were unaware that any reduc-
tion in the amount of beneﬁ  ts paid out due to their continued employ-
ment triggered an increase in beneﬁ  ts later.24 In recent years, Congress 
increased the exemption amount that workers could earn without having 
their beneﬁ  ts reduced. And, for beneﬁ  ciaries older than the Full Retire-
ment Age, it ﬁ  rst reduced the beneﬁ  t reduction for each dollar earned and 
then eliminated the test altogether in 2000. For those between age 62 and 
the Full Retirement Age, the test allows about $12,500 of earnings before 
reducing beneﬁ  ts by $1 for each $2 of earnings. Most studies suggest 
that the earnings test and these changes have had a substantial impact 
on the work effort of older people (see Friedberg 1998 and 2000; Haider 
and Loughran 2005; Friedberg and Webb 2006; Gustman and Steinmeier 
2007), though some conclude that the test has had little effect, at least for 
older men (Gruber and Orszag 2003).
The Delayed Retirement Credit, which increases beneﬁ  ts for each year 
an individual postpones claiming Social Security beneﬁ  ts between the 
Full Retirement Age and age 70, has also improved older workers’ incen-
tives to remain in the labor force. When introduced in 1971, the credit 
increased beneﬁ  ts by 1 percent per year for each year of delay between 
the Full Retirement Age and age 72. In 1983, Delayed Retirement Cred-
its were only granted up to age 70, but the adjustment was raised to 3 The Labor Supply of Older Americans 98
percent per year, and scheduled to increase to 8 percent per year by 2008. 
When fully phased in, the credit will, roughly speaking, be actuarially 
fair. The question then becomes what impact this increased credit for 
delaying claims will have on retirement decisions. Recent studies suggest 
that the delayed retirement credit may well have been an important fac-
tor in raising labor force participation rates among workers 65 and over 
(Coile and Gruber 2000; Pingle 2006).25
The End of Mandatory Retirement 
In the early 1970s about half of all employed Americans were covered 
by mandatory retirement provisions that required they leave their jobs 
no later than a certain age, usually 65. In 1978, the earliest legal age for 
mandatory retirement was increased from 65 to 70. In 1986, mandatory 
retirement was eliminated entirely for the majority of workers. As nearly 
all American workers in 1986 and after were out of the labor force by age 
70, however, this legislation probably had little to do with the subsequent 
rise in the labor supply of older workers. 
Changes in Employer Pension Plans 
Various changes in the structure of employer-sponsored retirement income 
plans have also reduced incentives to retire early. As noted earlier, in the 
early 1980s about 85 percent of U.S. workers with employer-sponsored 
pensions were covered by a deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plan; by 2004 the percentage 
of U.S. workers with deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  ts plans had declined to 37 percent. 
In contrast to the early retirement incentives commonly found in deﬁ  ned 
beneﬁ  t plans, 401(k)s and other deﬁ  ned contribution plans work like 
savings accounts and contain no incentives to retire at any particular age. 
Studies have documented that, on average, workers covered by 401(k) 
plans retire a year or two later than do similarly situated workers covered 
by a deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plan (see Friedberg and Webb 2005, Munnell, Cahill, 
and Jivan 2003). Among recently retired workers, however, dependence 
on deﬁ  ned contribution pensions had not increased dramatically. Thus 
the labor supply effect of the shift from deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t to deﬁ  ned contri-
bution plans primarily lies in the future, not in the past.26 
Another likely change, albeit poorly documented, is a shift since the 
mid-1980s away from sweetened early retirement beneﬁ  ts in traditional 
deﬁ  ned  beneﬁ   t pension plans. According to one industry expert, the 
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elimination of such early retirement incentives was a primary motive 
behind the conversion of a large number of pension plans, covering over 
20 percent of covered workers, to cash-balance formats (see Schieber 
2007). From the perspective of workers, cash-balance plans are much 
like deﬁ  ned contribution plans and neither subsidize nor penalize retire-
ment taken at any given age.27 In addition, many early retirement sweet-
eners in the past had been offered in special “one-time” windows. If the 
conversion to cash-balance formats does reﬂ  ect a shift away from early 
retirement subsidies, one would expect a comparable shift away from 
such one-time offers.28 The net effect could be an increase of one to two 
years, much like the effect of a shift from deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t to deﬁ  ned con-
tribution plans.
The Shift to Less Physically Demanding and More Psychologically 
Rewarding Jobs
The nature of employment has changed dramatically in the last 20 
years. As U.S. manufacturing industries have declined, the service sector 
has exploded. This shift, especially the expansion of knowledge-based 
employment, reﬂ  ects the growth in jobs often thought to have signif-
icant non-pecuniary rewards, found in places such as universities and 
hospitals, and in occupations such as software development, manage-
ment consulting, and graphic design. Even within the manufacturing 
sector, the composition of jobs has changed, as ﬁ  rms have automated 
or outsourced production and now employ more managers, engineers, 
and technicians.29 Generally, American jobs now entail more knowledge-
based activities that put less strain on older bodies, and provide more 
satisfaction for workers of all ages.30 Less physical strain and more non-
pecuniary rewards raises the value of remaining employed vis-à-vis tak-
ing retirement, thereby raising the supply of labor. A good portion of 
the increase in labor force participation since the mid-1980s, especially 
among workers aged 65 to 69 years, the group which saw the most dra-
matic gains in labor force participation, may be due to such changes. 
Joint Retirement Decisions
Another factor that may be encouraging men’s employment at later ages 
is the movement of married women into the labor force. When only the 
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based on the rewards of work, the generosity of his retirement beneﬁ  ts, 
and how continued employment would affect those beneﬁ  ts. With wives 
working, retirement decisions have become more complicated. Now cou-
ples need to consider how the decision to stop working will affect the 
rewards and beneﬁ  ts of both spouses. A growing number of studies sug-
gest that husbands and wives like to retire together.31 Since in the United 
States husbands are, on average, three years older than their wives, the 
increased labor force participation of wives would be expected to lead to 
the later retirement of men. 
The Decline in Post-Retirement Health Insurance
A ﬁ  nal factor affecting the labor force participation rates for older men 
is related to changes in employer-provided health insurance. Among 
the entire working-age population, employer-provided health insurance 
coverage may be declining, but it is declining very slowly. In contrast, 
employer provision of health insurance after retirement has dropped 
dramatically. According to the Kaiser Family Foundation, the percent 
of ﬁ  rms with 200 or more employees offering retiree health insurance 
dropped in half between 1988 and 2005; see Figure 3.11. This drop dra-
matically changes the incentives facing workers in their late 50s and early 
60s. If they stay with their employer, they will continue to receive health 
insurance. If they leave the workforce before age 65, when they qualify 
for Medicare, they will be uninsured and forced to purchase insurance on 
their own—a very expensive undertaking. The combination of a decline 
in retiree health insurance coverage with the rapid rise in healthcare costs 
gives workers a strong incentive to maintain their current employer-pro-
vided coverage until they qualify for Medicare at 65. 
In short, a large number of factors could explain the increase in labor 
force participation among older male workers since the mid-1980s. The 
contraction of the retirement income system, which increases participa-
tion via an “income effect,” is an effect that will take place mainly in the 
future. But substantial changes in Social Security beneﬁ  ts and employer-
provide pension plans have raised the value of work vis-à-vis retirement, 
which increases labor force participation via a “substitution effect.” The 
fact that the increase in older men’s participation has occurred mainly 
after age 62, and especially after age 65, suggests that changes in the 
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Social Security earnings test and the Delayed Retirement Credit have 
been quite important; refer again to Figure 3.10. On the other hand, a 
recent study focusing on this older segment of the workforce suggests 
that non-pecuniary considerations might also play an important role (see 
Haider and Loughran 2001). Older labor force participants tend to be 
among the more educated, healthiest, and wealthiest elderly Americans. 
Moreover, the fact that the wages earned at these older ages are lower 
than those of their younger counterparts, and lower than their own past 
earnings, suggests that money may not be the prime motivator for their 
continued labor force participation.32 
The important question is whether this trend toward later retirement 
will continue, and whether U.S. workers will respond to the contraction 
of the retirement income system by remaining in the workforce longer. 
Boomers certainly claim that they will want to work longer, but will they 
follow through with their plans?33 To provide some basis for predicting 
Figure 3.11 
Percent of U.S. Firms with 200 or More Workers Offering Retiree Health 
Benefits, 1988–2005
Source: Kaiser/Health Research and Educational Trust Employer Health Benefits 
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future labor force trends, the following sections look at how career pat-
terns have changed over time, the physical health of older workers, and 
the remaining incentives to retire early.34 
IV.  Patterns of Employment
The above discussion has focused on the labor force participation of 
older male workers. Another dimension of work patterns is the extent 
to which and when people change jobs over the course of their working 
life. This pattern is important because older workers are likely to have an 
easier time staying employed and enjoy higher wages if they remain with 
their long-term employer rather than scurrying about the labor market 
trying to ﬁ  nd a new job in their late 50s and early 60s. Evidence suggests 
that ﬁ  rms are reluctant to hire older workers, and the loss of ﬁ  rm-spe-
ciﬁ  c human capital means that productivity, and hence wages, often fall 
when workers move to a new job (see Lahey 2006, Johnson and Kawachi 
2007). 
Tenure Patterns
Despite the apparent interest of older workers in remaining with their 
current employer, one would expect to see shorter tenures and more 
mobility as a result of the shift from deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t to deﬁ  ned contri-
bution plans. The shift in employer-provided retirement plans reﬂ  ects a 
diminished interest in career employment on the part of both ﬁ  rms and 
employees. The original purpose of deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans was to induce 
workers to remain with their employer until retirement, then to retire 
“on time” at the age speciﬁ  ed in the plan (Sass 1997). To accomplish this 
goal, plans based beneﬁ  ts on years of service and earnings in a worker’s 
ﬁ  nal working years, so the value of accrued pension beneﬁ  ts increased 
rapidly as job tenures lengthened and earnings rose, and then declined as 
workers aged past critical benchmark ages. Workers with deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t 
plans who change jobs prematurely, even when moving to ﬁ  rms with 
identical plans and immediate vesting, receive signiﬁ  cantly lower ben-
eﬁ  ts in retirement than do workers with continuous coverage under a 
single plan. Both the changing mechanics of employment and changing 
tastes would lead one to expect more worker mobility and shorter job 
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tenures in a 401(k)-dominated world. These shifting incentives would be 
expected to affect primarily older workers, since at younger ages the pen-
sion costs of switching jobs have always been minimal. 
 This expectation is borne out in the median tenure data for employed 
males taken from the Current Population Survey and presented in Fig-
ure 3.12.35 The results are striking in two respects. First, before 1990 
the median years of job tenure is virtually ﬂ  at for every male age group 
between age 25 and age 64. These data conﬁ  rm much of the earlier work 
on mobility that showed very little change during the 1970s and 1980s 
(see Neumark 2000, Gottschalk and Mofﬁ  tt 1999). Second, beginning 
in 1990, after a decade of 401(k) plans being in place, the median job 
tenure for men at older ages (55+) starts to decline. If the shift in pension 
coverage from deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans to deﬁ  ned contribution plans were 
to have an effect, this is where and when one would expect to ﬁ  nd it. As 
noted above, pension accumulations are very small at younger ages, and 
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Figure 3.12 
Median Years of Tenure for Employed American Men by Age, 1973–2004 
(Current Population Survey data) 
Source: Authors’ calculations from U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
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type of pension coverage would affect the mobility only of older work-
ers.36 Similarly, we would not expect the effect to become evident until a 
signiﬁ  cant percent of older workers were covered by 401(k) plans, and 
this did not happen until the 1990s.
 The Current Population Survey data can also be used to see how many 
workers remain with the employer they worked for when they were age 
50.37 The results for the years 1983 and 2004, which are shown in Figure 
3.13, mirror the tenure information presented above. In the early survey, 
at age 60, almost 80 percent of male workers were working for the same 
ﬁ  rm as they were when they were 50 years old. By 2003, the picture 
changes noticeably; at age 60 less than 45 percent were working full time 
with their age-50 employer. In short, male workers in their 50s appear 
to be shifting jobs more in a pension world dominated by 401(k) plans 
than they did when covered by deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans. The old notion that 
men settle into some form of lifetime employment by middle age and 
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Figure 3.13 
Percent of American Men Working Full-Time Who Remained in the Same Job 
since Age 50, 1983 and 2004
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
U.S. Census Bureau (1983, 2004).
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American men. One question this prompts is the extent to which this job 
switching at older ages is voluntary. That is, do workers move on their 
own volition or are they laid off from a long-held job, and forced to ﬁ  nd 
a new one? One measure of layoffs is displacement rates. Have job dis-
placement rates increased over time? 
Displacement Rates
The Displaced Worker Surveys attempt to measure the number of work-
ers who have lost their job through no fault of their own.38 The displace-
ment rates for older workers, while cyclical, show no discernable upward 
or downward trend over the period 1984–2004; see Figure 3.14. 
Simple averages, however, cannot reliably indicate whether the plight 
of older U.S. workers is getting better or worse, because many factors 
are changing simultaneously. For example, the educational gap between 
older and younger workers has virtually disappeared, which suggests that 
older workers—all else remaining equal—should be less likely to be laid 
off. On the other hand, the shift away from career employment—deﬁ  ned 
as employment with a single ﬁ  rm from middle-age (at the latest) until 
Figure 3.14 
Job Displacement Rates by Age Group, 1984–2004
Source: Munnell, Sass, Soto, and Zhivan (2006) based on U.S. Bureau of Labor 
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retirement—suggests older workers would be more likely to be laid off. 
In order to isolate the impact of age on displacement rates, it is necessary 
to control for the various ways in which older workers might differ from 
their younger counterparts. This can be done through the use of a probit 
regression that estimates the probability of being displaced from one’s 
job, and includes variables for gender, marital status, race, education, 
industry, and full-time status as well as age.39 Controlling for these other 
factors, Figure 3.15 shows the effect of age on the probability of being 
displaced. Being in the 50-54-year-old age group reduces the probability 
of being displaced by somewhere between 0 percent and 7 percent. Inter-
estingly, the beneﬁ  cial effect of increased age on job tenure appears to 
be declining over time.40 Thus, the results suggest that older workers are 
slightly more likely to be laid off today then they were in the past. 
But that is not the end of the story. Figure 3.16 reports the results for 
the same type of equation, but this time includes tenure variables, and 
Figure 3.15 
Probability of Job Displacement for U.S. Workers Aged 50 to 64 Years, 
Compared with the Probability for U.S. Workers Aged 20 to 49 Years, 1984–
2004 (Displaced Worker Survey)
Source: Munnell, Sass, Soto, and Zhivan (2006) based on U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and U.S. Census Bureau (2004).
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shows that job tenure—not age—protected older workers from displace-
ment. Holding tenure constant, older workers are actually more likely 
than their younger counterparts to be displaced.41 Thus, to the extent 
that workers change jobs late in their careers, they are increasing their 
risk of eventual displacement. These older workers lose the protection 
afforded by long-term tenure and face the increased risk of displacement 
associated with age. Involuntary displacement has an extremely negative 
effect on the probability of older workers getting another job (Chan and 
Stevens 2001). This reduced probability could be the result of workers 
not being willing to supply their labor at the lower wages they are offered 
in the labor market, or of employers being unwilling to hire displaced 
older workers. It is very difﬁ  cult to untangle the effects of labor supply 
and labor demand. But it appears that older workers have already expe-
rienced some increase in displacement risk, and put themselves more at 
risk when they change jobs. Therefore, not all of the increase in mobility 
among older workers appears to be voluntary. 
Figure 3.16 
The Effect of Job Tenure and Age on the Probability of Displacement for Older 
U.S. Workers, 2004 (Displaced Worker Survey) 
Source: Munnell, Sass, Soto, and Zhivan (2006) based on U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and U.S. Census Bureau (2004).
Note: All results are statistically significant.
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Changes in Compensation and the Effect on Labor Supply 
Two recent changes—the rapid rise in the share of older workers in the 
labor force and the decline of career employment—could signiﬁ  cantly 
affect the compensation received by older workers, and thereby their 
labor supply. 
The share of older workers in the U.S. labor force is increasing sig-
niﬁ  cantly. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, workers aged 
55–64 years rose from 9 percent of the workforce in 1990 to 14 percent 
today, and are projected to exceed 18 percent in 2020, as shown in Figure 
3.17.
Economic theory suggests that the age distribution of the workforce 
affects the wage structure, and the relative wages of older workers do 
appear to be inversely related to the share of older workers in the com-
position of the labor force. The notion here is that workers with different 
amounts of labor market experience are imperfect substitutes for each 
other. More experienced workers, who have acquired on-the-job training 
or simply learned by doing, generally perform different tasks and play 
Figure 3.17 
Labor Force Shares and Wages of Men Aged 55 to 64 Years as a Percent of Male 
U.S. Workers Aged 64 Years and Younger, 1962–2006
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. 
Census Bureau (1962–2006) and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2007). 
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different roles within the organization. As the supply of workers with a 
given level of experience grows, the wages of that group will decline rela-
tive to the rest of the workforce, producing a cohort effect. The magni-
tude of the wage decline will depend on the extent to which workers with 
different degrees of experience can substitute for each other. 
A number of studies have examined how relative wages have changed 
as the baby boom generation ﬁ  rst entered the market and then aged. 
A now-famous analysis, subtitled “The Baby Boom Babies’ Financial 
Bust,” found that the wages of young white men were reduced relative 
to those of older white men as the baby boomer cohorts started entering 
the labor market (Welch 1979).42 A recent study found that the depres-
sion of wages due to cohort crowding follows workers throughout their 
careers (Triest, Sapozhnikov, and Sass 2006). Thus, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that the increasing share of older workers in the labor force 
will depress their wages relative to those of younger workers.
Two further comments are required regarding the cohort crowding effect. 
First, the shift away from deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans has reduced the relative 
compensation of older workers even more than indicated by the decline in 
relative wages. Pensions in deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans are based on tenure and 
ﬁ  nal salary, and become more costly to the employer as workers approach 
retirement; so the value of non-wage pension compensation in deﬁ  ned ben-
eﬁ  t plans rises rapidly at the end of workers’ careers. The shift to 401(k) 
plans has eliminated such differential non-wage compensation received by 
older workers, which reinforces the ﬁ  nding that the increasing share of 
older workers in the labor market has an adverse effect on their market 
value. On the other hand, U.S. labor force growth in general is slated to 
slow. It is possible that the supply of labor may fall short of demand, 
thereby putting upward pressure on labor compensation, an effect that 
could mitigate some of the downward pressure on the compensation of 
older workers. On balance, however, both the experience premium and 
pension gains enjoyed by older workers will likely be lower in the future. 
As a result, work will look less desirable for older Americans relative to 
retirement and, as a result, they may be less willing to supply their labor. 
The second labor-market change that could affect the labor supply of 
older men is the decline of career employment. This change, which was 
discussed above, is depicted clearly in Figure 3.18, which classiﬁ  es the 
male population aged 55–64 in 1983 and in 2004 as: a) not working; b) The Labor Supply of Older Americans 110
working part-time; c) working full-time with same employer as at age 50; 
or d) working full-time with a different employer. The portion of this age 
group not working (36 percent–35 percent) or working part-time (4 per-
cent–5 percent) was virtually identical in 1983 and 2004. But the distri-
bution of full-time workers changed dramatically. In 1983, most full-time 
workers aged 55–64 years were with their age-50 employer, while in 2003 
only about half of this same age group was with their same employer.43 
This increase in mobility would be expected to impact wages. Separa-
tions from long-term employment relationships involve a loss of ﬁ  rm-
speciﬁ  c human capital. Job changes also involve a loss of seniority-based 
protections that shield older workers from the consequences of skill ero-
sion. Thus, a shift to a new employer would seem to suggest a fall in wage 
and beneﬁ  t compensation. A simple comparison of wages for full-time 
workers who switch jobs with those who do not reveals that over the 
Figure 3.18 
Employment Patterns of American Men Aged 55 to 64 Years, 1983 and 2004
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
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1983–2004 period, the wages of job switchers averaged about 75 percent 
of those for full-time workers who remained with their age-50 employer; 
see Figure 3.19. 
Interestingly, regardless of the reason why workers leave a long-term 
employer, their subsequent earnings tend to decline. A recent study (John-
son and Kawachi 2007) used the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
to explore the effect of job changes on wages, beneﬁ  ts, and satisfaction 
among workers aged 45–75 years who changed employers between 1986 
and 2004. Figure 3.20 shows how those older workers leaving jobs held 
for more than 10 years were distributed by age and by reason for separa-
tion: retirement, layoff, voluntary quit, and “involuntary quit” (health, 
family reasons, personal problems, dissatisfaction with working condi-
tions, etc.) Workers were characterized as retired if they said they left their 
previous job to retire. Most of the moves recorded in the HRS occurred 
among workers aged 51–60. Retirements accounted for about one-third, 
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Figure 3.19 
Percent of American Men Aged 55 to 64 Years Working Full-time Who 
Switched Jobs, and Switchers’ Wages as a Percent of Non-Switchers’ Wages, 
1983–2004
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and 
U.S. Census Bureau (1983–2004). 
Note: A “switcher” is one who no longer works for his age-50 employer.The Labor Supply of Older Americans 112
layoffs for about one-third, and voluntary and involuntary quits for the 
remaining third of job separations. 
Intuitively, one would think that the relationship between the reason 
for leaving a job and the workers’ subsequent wages would be as follows: 
wages would fall sharply in the case of retirement, because the purpose 
of leaving is to work less hard. The second biggest decline would occur 
in the case of layoffs, because displaced workers usually face a costly 
search process and end up in an inferior position. A smaller decline might 
occur among those who quit for personal or health reasons. Finally, one 
might expect no decline and even an increase in wages for those who quit 
Figure 3.20 
Percent of Older American Workers Who Changed Jobs, by Age and Reason for 
Separation, 1986–2004
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Johnson and Kawachi (2007).
Note: Figure refers to those workers in the Health and Retirement Study whose 
former job lasted more than 10 years. “Involuntary quit” includes leaving job 
because of relocation, poor health and disability, family or child care 
responsibilities, marriage, spouse’s preferences, personal problems, or 
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voluntarily, presumably to accept “better jobs” with higher compensa-
tion and/or more non-monetary rewards. The percent losing pension and 
health beneﬁ  ts would be expected to follow a similar pattern. Figure 3.21 
conﬁ  rms the expected pattern, with the exception that even those who 
quit voluntarily suffer some drop in wages. 
The conclusion that emerges from this evidence is that increased job 
mobility, like the effect of cohort crowding, will mean that the relative 
compensation of older workers will likely decline. This lower compensa-
Figure 3.21
Percent Decline in Wages and Fringe Benefits Among Older American Men Who 
Changed Jobs after 10 Years or More with Former Employer
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Johnson and Kawachi (2007).
Note: This figure shows wage and fringe benefit changes for workers whose 
former job lasted more than 10 years. Loss of pension encompasses those who 
were covered by a pension on their old job but not on their new job. Loss of 
health benefits encompasses those who were covered by health benefits on their 
old job but not on their new job.“Involuntary quit” includes leaving job because 
of relocation, poor health and disability, family or child care responsibilities, 
marriage, spouse’s preferences, personal problems, or dissatisfaction with work 
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tion can be expected to reduce the willingness of workers to supply their 
labor at older ages. One confounding effect of this conclusion, however, 
is that laid-off workers, as well as those who quit, report signiﬁ  cant non-
pecuniary gains (Johnson and Kawachi 2007). The new jobs tend to be 
less stressful and less physically demanding than their old ones. And more 
workers report that they enjoy work. 
More Heterogeneity in Labor Supply at Older Ages
The shift to 401(k) plans and the increased mobility of older workers also 
means that in the future retirement is going to become a much messier 
process than it was in the past.44 When mandatory retirement was the 
norm, both parties knew that the employer-employee relationship would 
end at a certain age. Employers also used traditional deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pen-
sion plans to structure an orderly departure. No such structure exists in a 
401(k) environment. Employers face the prospect of workers with declin-
ing productivity and inadequate 401(k) balances hanging onto their jobs 
much longer than, from the employer’s standpoint, is desirable. In fact, 
employers in a recent survey employers indicated that they expect half of 
their older workers will lack the resources needed to retire at their tradi-
tional retirement age; that they expect half of these unprepared workers 
will want to remain on the job; and that the employers were lukewarm 
about retaining even half of those who will want to stay on (Munnell, 
Sass, and Aubry 2006). Employers will thus need new severance tools to 
manage an older workforce. Without such means, employers will avoid 
retaining or hiring older workers. The severance tool could be a “car-
rot,” such as a generous retirement package, or a “stick,” such as some 
form of mandatory retirement. Of course, the latter would be extremely 
controversial. But it is important to recognize that the shift away from 
employer-deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans means no mechanism exists to ease the 
bulk of the baby boom into retirement. 
V.  The Health of Older Workers
Intuitively, people’s health affects their ability and desire to participate 
in the labor force. Poor health can make work seem very difﬁ  cult and 
unpleasant, leading people to withdraw from the labor force. Poor health 
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can also reduce people’s productivity, leading to lower wages, and lower 
wages reduce the incentive to work. In the last 35 years, the impact of 
health on labor force activity has become a major area of research, and 
virtually all studies show that poor health has a negative effect on the 
likelihood of remaining in the labor force, and on the expected retirement 
age, as well as hours worked and wages received.45 The question is the 
extent to which health concerns pose an obstacle to people’s ability to 
remain in the labor force longer. 
One starting point for exploring the health of older workers is to look 
at trends in life expectancy at age 50. Figure 3.22 shows life expectancy 
at age 50 for American males over the twentieth century. Interestingly, 
life expectancy at older ages rose very slowly at the beginning of the cen-
tury and then accelerated sharply toward the end of the century. In fact, 
life expectancy at age 50 was not very different in 1970 than in 1900—23 
years versus 21 years. After 1970, however, life expectancy for American 
men at age 50 took off, rising to 27 years in 2000, and is projected to 
increase to 30 years by 2030.
Although longer life spans generally imply improvements in health, 
keeping less healthy people alive could actually increase the percent of 
the population with disabilities. Thus, for a time, researchers referred to 
the “failure of success” resulting from improvements in healthcare (see 
Waidmann, Bound, and Schoenbaum 1995). Today, the notion of such an 
increase in frailty among the elderly—those aged 65 years and older—has 
been decisively rejected. In 2002, a technical working group examined 
disability trends for older Americans recorded across ﬁ  ve major national 
surveys.46 The group concluded that, when standardizing for the deﬁ  ni-
tion of disability, the time period, and the consistent inclusion or exclu-
sion of the nursing home population, all ﬁ  ve surveys showed consistent 
downward trends for two common disability measures—having difﬁ  culty 
with daily activities and requiring help with daily activities—beginning 
in the early to mid-1990s. The evidence remained mixed for a change in 
disability rates the 1980s and for the overall trend using a third measure 
of disability—the use of help or equipment with daily activities. 
The fact that the health of older Americans has improved would lead 
one to conclude that the health of the older working-age population has 
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obvious. The major survey that tracked disabilities among the working-
age population—the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS)—showed 
the percent of this population with disabilities increasing from the mid-
1960s through the early 1980s; see Figure 3.23.47 Decennial census data 
also showed an increase in the fraction of both working-age men and 
women unable to work dur  ing the 1970s. Skeptics of the increasing dis-
ability story contend that the trend during the 1970s may, at least in part, 
reﬂ  ect social factors such as earlier detec  tion and diagnosis of chronic 
diseases and greater availability of disability insurance.48 Thus, the trend 
in the prevalence of disabilities during the 1970s remains controversial. 
Since the early to mid-1980s, however, the health of the older U.S. 
working-age population has unquestionably improved. The per  cent of 
those aged 45–64 years with a disability declined through the mid-1990s, 
as shown in Figure 3.23. Between 1997 and 2004, responses to a similar 
survey question produced a more stable trend. But the general conclu-
sion emerging from the NHIS data is one of declining disability among 
Figure 3.23 
Percent of American Men Aged 45 to 64 Years with Disabilities, 1967–2004
(National Health Interview Survey)
Source: National Center for Health Statistics (1967–2004).
Note: From 2002 to 2004, the figure shows work limitations for all persons 
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older working-age individuals to a level that is at least comparable to that 
in the mid-1960s. Thus, the evidence suggests that the health of older 
work  ers is at least as good today as it was forty years ago. Moreover, as 
mentioned earlier, today’s jobs are much less physically demanding. As 
a result, physical limita  tions should not inhibit the ability of the bulk of 
older Americans to work at least until their mid-60s. 
The same data that support the possibility of continued work for the 
bulk of the older working population also it make clear that, despite a 
positive trend, 15 to 20 percent of people in their late 50s and 60s will ﬁ  nd 
it virtually impossible to continue participating in the labor force. The 
data from the NHIS are consistent with responses from the Health and 
Retirement Study regarding the extent to which retirement was volun-
tary. As shown in Figure 3.24, 35 percent of those Americans who retired 
between 1992 and 2002 claimed that their retirement was involuntary, 
with 18 percent citing poor health as the reason for leaving the work-
force. Moreover, many of those people who need to work longer—particu-
Figure 3.24 
American Workers’ Reasons for Retiring, 1992–2002
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larly low-wage workers dependent on Social Security for the bulk of their 
retirement income—are precisely the same individuals who have physi-
cally onerous jobs that stress their health, and who lack educa  tion, which 
has been shown to be important in managing their medical care. Thus, the 
“working longer prescription” must be administered with care, as some 
older Americans will simply be unable to adhere to this protocol. 
VI.  Obstacles to the Labor Force Participation of Older American 
Workers 
At least two major obstacles might hinder older workers from offering 
their services in the coming years and decades. The ﬁ  rst is the availability 
of Social Security beneﬁ  ts at age 62. The second is the fact that employ-
ment seems to be an “all or nothing” full-time proposition, with rela-
tively little room for gradually reducing hours or working part-time. 
Social Security’s Earliest Age of Eligibility
Social Security offers retirement beneﬁ  ts at 62 years of age. The early 
retirement beneﬁ  ts are actuarially reduced, and the reduction is designed 
to be “age-neutral.” That is, two people with average life expectancy—
one who claims beneﬁ  ts at 62, the other at 65—receive equal lifetime 
Social Security beneﬁ  ts.49 Despite the actuarial reduction, the vast major-
ity of American workers continue to claim Social Security beneﬁ  ts well 
before reaching age 65. In 2004, 59 percent of women and 54 percent of 
men claimed beneﬁ  ts at age 62; see Figure 3.25. The claiming of beneﬁ  ts 
coincides with the average retirement age, which is now 63 years for men 
and 62 years for women.50 
Social Security’s retirement age for full beneﬁ  ts is scheduled to increase 
from 65 to 67 years by 2022.51 But under current law, the EEA remains 
unchanged at 62. Raising the full retirement age, however, will increase 
the actuarial reduction for claiming beneﬁ  ts at age 62 from 20 percent 
to 30 percent. But people’s claiming behavior and retirement decisions 
appear more sensitive to the availability of beneﬁ   ts than to beneﬁ  t 
amounts, so age 62 may well remain an important retirement benchmark 
for many Americans.52 The Labor Supply of Older Americans 120
Raising the EEA to 64 would likely encourage people to work longer 
by removing the opportunity to get beneﬁ  ts earlier. But this proposal 
is controversial. First, without instituting any other changes, raising the 
EEA has virtually no impact on the system’s long-term ﬁ  nances. Any addi-
tional work effort brings in some additional payroll tax revenues, but 
the fact that the beneﬁ  ts were actuarially reduced means virtually no net 
savings.53 Second, as discussed above, a signiﬁ  cant fraction of Americans 
will be unable to work past age 62, either because they are in poor health, 
because their jobs are physically demanding, or because they have expe-
rienced job displacement later in life, and cannot ﬁ  nd work at their age.54 
Therefore raising the EEA would inevitably involve some expansion of 
the disability program for older workers or some similar accommoda-
tion. Another problem is that a higher EEA would reduce lifetime Social 
Security wealth for those with lower-than-average life expectancies. Since 
African-Americans and low-wage workers have lower-than-average life 
expectancies, a higher EEA might be considered unfair to these groups. 
Figure 3.25 
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So raising the EEA might need to be part of a larger reform package 
which includes provisions that offset such losses to particular groups.
Raising the EEA, however, seems like an essential step to ensure that 
older adults continue to participate in the labor force. Moreover, rais-
ing this ofﬁ  cial age may not only increase the willingness of workers 
to supply their labor but may also enhance the willingness of employ-
ers to retain and hire older workers. A recent survey asked ﬁ  rms about 
the impact of various characteristics that affect their evaluation of older 
workers. A major negative factor was the perception that older work-
ers will be on the job for only a short time. To the extent that the likely 
departure date can be pushed out, employers will be more willing to hire, 
train, and promote older workers. 
Firms’ Resistance to Part-Time Employment 
Another hurdle to the continued employment of older workers is that 
they consistently report wanting to work part-time. For example, a study 
based on the Health and Retirement Study reports that 56 percent of 
respondents aged 55 to 65 years in 1996 said they would prefer to gradu-
ally reduce their hours as they age (U.S. General Accounting Ofﬁ  ce 2001). 
Consistent with this ﬁ  nding, older self-employed people tend to reduce 
their work hours as they approach retirement. But few older workers 
have part-time positions, and part-time employment does not appear to 
be increasing; see Figure 3.26.
Currently, part-time employment is concentrated in small business 
establishments and in ﬁ  rms in the service sector (Montgomery 1988). 
This remains true even after controlling for other factors that would 
affect labor demand, such as wages, fringe beneﬁ  ts, seasonal ﬂ  uctuations 
in demand, and hiring costs. It is not exactly clear why this is the case. 
Large ﬁ  rms might avoid hiring part-time workers because such workers 
tend to have higher turnover rates than full-time employees (Tilly 1991). 
Part-time work might be more common in the service sector because 
it is labor intensive and is subject to large ﬂ  uctuations in demand, and 
because employers ﬁ  nd it is easier to manage these ﬂ  uctuations by using 
part-time workers. While all these theories are plausible, these explana-
tions have not been supported by rigorous empirical studies (Hutchens 
2001). Without an increase in the availability of part-time employment, The Labor Supply of Older Americans 122
however, many older adults may be unwilling to keep working. A recent 
study estimates that increased ﬂ  exibility in work schedules would double 
the number of people entering partial retirement (Gustman and Stein-
meier 2007). 
In short, despite the need to build up their stock of retirement wealth, 
older workers may ﬁ  nd the lack of part-time work opportunities and the 
availability of Social Security beneﬁ  ts at age 62 too tempting to pass up, 
and continue to retire early. And not all older people can remain in the 
workforce into their mid- to late-60s. Some have health problems or have 
been laid off and are unable to ﬁ  nd another job, while others see contin-
ued employment as simply too onerous. 
VI. Conclusion
Greater labor force participation by older U.S. workers would make an 
important contribution to national output, increase tax revenues, and 
dramatically improve retirement income security. Some indication that 
people might be willing to work longer comes from the fact that the cen-
tury-long downward trend in the labor force participation of older men 
Figure 3.26 
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has clearly ceased, and their participation has actually been rising since 
the mid-1990s. The question is whether this upward trend in older men’s 
workforce participation will continue. 
Going forward, some key changes in the nation’s retirement income 
system should encourage greater labor force participation by older work-
ers. The share of pre-retirement earnings Social Security will replace at 
any claiming age is falling. Given rising longevity and the meager bal-
ances in the now dominant 401(k) accounts, the replacement income pro-
vided by employer plans, for retirement at any given age, is also likely to 
fall. The “income effect” of such reductions should increase labor force 
participation. In addition, the shift to 401(k)s and changes in the Social 
Security program that have essentially eliminated the subsidies for taking 
early retirement and penalties for taking later retirement should also raise 
participation rates. The “substitution effect” of these changes is to raise 
the cost of retirement relative to work to its actuarially appropriate level. 
Moreover, jobs in today’s economy are less physically demanding, and 
today’s older people are healthier than earlier cohorts. 
Impediments still remain, however, to the continued employment of 
older workers. The most important obstacle is the availability of Social 
Security beneﬁ  ts at age 62. Even today, with the elimination of the earn-
ings test after the Full Retirement Age and an actuarially fair Delayed 
Retirement Credit, the majority of U.S. workers continue to claim their 
beneﬁ  ts as soon as they are eligible to do so. Another important factor 
is the decline in career employment, with the majority of older workers 
now needing to negotiate the vagaries of the labor market if they are to 
work into their mid- to late-60s. Enduring extended and difﬁ  cult job 
searches, as well as confronting the prospect of only earning low wages, 
may cause many older workers to simply give up and exit the workforce. 
Moreover, older people have a strong preference for part-time jobs and 
ﬂ  exible work schedules, desires which, to date, many employers have 
been reluctant to accommodate. Finally, 15 percent to 20 percent of older 
people are probably not healthy enough to work beyond age 62. 
What’s the bottom line? Today, approximately 70 percent of American 
men aged 55–64 years are in the labor force, up from a low of 66 per-
cent in the mid-1990s. Given the contraction of the retirement income 
system, labor force participation for this group is unlikely to start head-The Labor Supply of Older Americans 124
ing back down. Will it continue to increase? In 1960, before men could 
claim Social Security beneﬁ  ts at age 62, before the enactment of Medicare 
and signiﬁ  cant increases in Social Security replacement rates, and before 
employer pensions became a widespread source of retirement income, 87 
percent of men aged 55–64 years were in the labor force. We are unlikely 
to see this high level again, given the increase in household wealth, some 
of which people want to spend on more leisure at the end of their work 
life, and the availability of Social Security beneﬁ  ts at age 62. Our best 
guess is that by 2030, without a signiﬁ  cant change, such as an increase 
in Social Security’s Earliest Eligibility Age, labor force participation rates 
for men 55–64 years may be 75 percent—up ﬁ  ve percentage points from 
today’s levels. This number is higher than the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
projection of 69 percent, as shown in Figure 3.27.
About 28 percent of American men aged 65–74 years are in the labor 
force today. Again, this percentage is unlikely to decline. Here, the 1960 
level of almost 40 percent is a relevant benchmark for comparison. Again, 
some additional participation is likely to occur by 2030, but not to levels 
Figure 3.27 
Older American Men’s Actual Labor Force Participation Rates, 1962–2006, with 
Projection to 2030
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Census Bureau (1980–2006) and 
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seen in the 1960s. On balance, the employment of older workers in the 
United States will likely rise, but fall well short of levels seen in 1960. 
Without changes that produce a further increase in participation rates, 
and raise the average retirement age to 66 or even 67 years, Americans 
are likely to see a signiﬁ  cant drop in living standards in retirement. 
 The authors would like to thank Jerilyn Libby for excellent research 
assistance on this project.
1. Under legislation enacted in 1983, the increase in the Full Retirement Age 
began with those born in 1938, and turning 62 in 2000, and will be fully phased 
in for those born in 1960, and turning age 62 in 2022.
2. The premium for Medicare Part B is projected to increase from 9 percent of 
the average Social Security beneﬁ  t in 2006 to 11 percent in 2030. 
3. The pension coverage data discussed above apply only to individual work-
ers at any given point in time. Over a lifetime and on a household, rather than 
an individual basis, coverage rates are somewhat higher. For households with 
two adults aged 55–64 years, the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances shows that 
approximately 65 percent of households had some sort of pension coverage in 
2001. Pension coverage is much more extensive for high-income households.
4.  The annuity might provide a dollar amount per month for each year of service, 
say $50—so workers with 20 years of service would receive $1,000 per month 
at age 65. The beneﬁ  t could also be a percentage of ﬁ  nal salary for each year of 
service, say 1.5 percent; so workers with 20 years would receive 30 percent (20 
years at 1.5 percent) of ﬁ  nal salary for as long as they live. The employer ﬁ  nances 
these beneﬁ  ts by making pre-tax contributions into a pension fund; the company 
holds the assets in trust, directs the investments, and bears the risk. The Pension 
Beneﬁ  t Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) insures pension beneﬁ  ts up to speciﬁ  ed 
limits. The PBGC monthly guarantee limit in 2007 is $4,125 at age 65 years, and 
declines to $1,856 at age 55. Employers pay for this insurance with premiums 
largely determined by the plan’s funding status.
5. For a 401(k), generally the employee, and often the employer, contributes 
a speciﬁ   ed percentage of earnings into the account. These contributions are 
invested, usually at the direction of the employee, mostly in mutual funds con-
sisting of stocks and bonds. Upon termination of employment or retirement, the 
worker generally receives the balance as a lump sum, albeit with the option to 
roll it over to an IRA.
6.  This amount includes Individual Retirement Account (IRA) balances, because 
most of the money in IRAs is rolled over from 401(k) plans after an employer 
leaves a job. For further details, see Munnell and Sundén (2006). 
7. In 401(k) plans, workers must decide whether or not to join the plan, how 
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about company stock, whether to roll over accumulations when changing jobs, 
and how to withdraw the money at retirement. The evidence indicates that a 
signiﬁ  cant fraction of participants make serious mistakes at every step along the 
way. A quarter of those eligible to participate in 401(k) plans choose not to do 
so. Over half of those that do participate fail to diversify their investments. Many 
over-invest in company stock. Almost no participants re-balance their portfolios 
as they age or in response to market returns. Most importantly, many cash out 
these accounts when they change jobs, rather than rolling them over to another 
401(k) or IRA, and very few annuitize these accounts at retirement to guarantee 
a lifetime income stream. The basic problem is that for most individuals, making 
their own ﬁ  nancial decisions is difﬁ  cult. Most participants lack sufﬁ  cient ﬁ  nan-
cial experience, training, or time to ﬁ  gure out what to do, and the end result is 
often a signiﬁ  cant shortfall in their retirement savings. 
8.  Penner and Johnson (2006) estimate that rising healthcare costs and the taxes 
required to cover these costs in retirement will require a moderate-income couple 
to work an additional 2.5 years, under the scenario assuming higher healthcare 
costs and higher tax burdens, to receive as much income in the ﬁ  rst year of retire-
ment—net of taxes and out-of-pocket health spending—as they would receive 
under the low-cost scenario of more moderate healthcare costs and future taxes. 
9. In addition to addressing the ﬁ  nancial issue, working longer appears to help 
individuals maintain their overall physical and mental well-being (see Calvo 
2006). 
10.  Similarly, Butrica, Johnson, Smith, and Steuerle (2006) concluded that many 
people could increase their consumption by more than 25 percent at older ages 
simply by retiring at age 67 instead of age 62. 
11. A 1570 census of the poor, in Norwich, England, thus found three widows, 
aged 74, 79 and 82 years, “almost past work” but still earning a small income 
from spinning. Estates left by the elderly in colonial America often included tools 
used in less strenuous trades, such as tailoring, spinning, shoemaking, and weav-
ing. And well into the nineteenth century, about half of all 80-year-old men in 
America still worked (Thane 2000). 
12. The Census measured the “gainful employment rate” until 1940 and then 
the labor force participation rate, deﬁ  ned as the percentage of the adult popula-
tion working or actively looking for work. 
13. See  Graebner  (1980).
14. Life expectancy at age 20 for men in 1900 was 44 years, compared to 59 
years in 2000 (U.S. Social Security Administration). Also see Lee (2001) for the 
rapid rise in the expected length of retirement of workers entering the labor force 
between 1850 and 1990. 
15.  Favorable tax provisions had a limited effect on employer-provided pension 
coverage before World War II, as less than 10 percent of the adult population 
typically paid income tax. But the postwar growth of mass income taxation made 
pensions far less costly to employers and workers, and thus encouraged their 
spread. 
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16.  Using evidence from the coal boom and bust, the collapse of the steel industry, 
and the general decline in manufacturing, Black and Liang (2005) conclude that 
the individual retirement decision is sensitive to prevailing economic conditions. 
This response most likely reﬂ  ects elements of both labor supply and demand. 
17.  For example, suppose a person will live for 20 years and is entitled to a pen-
sion of $15,000 at age 65; lifetime beneﬁ  ts will equal $300,000 (20 × $15,000). 
To keep lifetime beneﬁ  ts actuarially constant, if that employee retired at 55, and 
was expected to live until age 85, his annual beneﬁ  t should be only $10,000 per 
year (30 × $10,000 = $300,000). But traditional deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans typically 
provide far more because they use an actuarial reduction that is smaller than the 
full reduction. For instance, these plans might pay, say, $12,000 at age 55, which 
means that the worker in this example who retires at 55 would receive $360,000 
(30 × $12,0000), substantially more in lifetime pension beneﬁ  ts than if he were 
to retire at 65. This exercise is actually somewhat more complicated because the 
employee adds to his pension if he continues to work, but the general example 
illustrates our main point. 
18. Often, working beyond the plan’s normal retirement age results in negative 
pension accruals. The law requires that the wage increases of those who work 
beyond the plan’s normal retirement age be reﬂ  ected in higher retirement ben-
eﬁ  ts. But the law does not prevent ﬁ  rms from capping the years of service used to 
calculate beneﬁ  ts; nor does it require ﬁ  rms to provide actuarially fair adjustments 
for the fact that longer-working participants will receive beneﬁ  ts for fewer years 
(McGill et. al. 1996).
19.  The change was made primarily to help younger widows and to allow wives, 
who were presumed to be two to three years younger than their husbands, to 
claim beneﬁ  ts at the same time as their husbands. Since it seemed unfair to require 
women workers to wait until a later age to receive beneﬁ  ts than mandated for 
non-working women, the EEA was introduced for all women. See Congressional 
Budget Ofﬁ  ce (1999). 
20. In addition, Blau (1998) concludes that the availability of Social Security 
beneﬁ  ts is very important to the retirement decision, while changes in Social Secu-
rity beneﬁ  ts over time have been considerably less important to this decision. On 
the other hand, Gruber (2000) found a sizable labor supply response to the level 
of disability beneﬁ  ts when comparing labor force participation in the Quebec 
system and in the rest of Canada, where disability beneﬁ  ts were increased. 
21.  For more details on recent trends, see Purcell (2005).
22. Under current law, individuals with less than $25,000 and married couples 
with less than $32,000 of “combined income” do not have to pay taxes on their 
Social Security beneﬁ  ts. (Combined income is adjusted gross income as reported 
on tax forms, plus nontaxable interest income, plus one-half of Social Security 
beneﬁ  ts.) Above those thresholds, recipients must pay taxes on either 50 or 85 
percent of their beneﬁ  ts. Individuals must pay tax on 50 percent of their beneﬁ  ts 
if their “combined income” is between $25,000 and $34,000, and on 85 per-
cent if above $34,000. A couple must pay tax on 50 percent of their beneﬁ  ts if 
their “combined income” is between $32,000 and $44,000, and on 85 percent if The Labor Supply of Older Americans 128
above $44,000. (Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives 
2000). 
23. Beneﬁ  ts were cut a bit more than 1 percent per year until reaching a 6.7 
percent cut for the cohorts turning 62 in between 2005 and 2017; the beneﬁ  t 
cuts then resume and reach the full 13.4 percent reduction for cohorts turning 
62 in 2022 and after. This full reduction will affect those cohorts born in 1960 
and thereafter.
24. Prior to the introduction of early retirement, the earnings test was a tax, in 
that beneﬁ  ts lost in one year did not produce a beneﬁ  t gain in later years. 
25. Coile and Gruber (2000) note that in a context where workers make their 
retirement decisions based on the full future stream of Social Security beneﬁ  ts, 
raising the Delayed Retirement Credit could have a larger effect than raising the 
Full Retirement Age. Changing the Full Retirement Age has both an income effect 
that encourages work and a substitution effect that discourages work (via lower 
Social Security beneﬁ  t accruals); but a change in the Delayed Retirement Credit 
has only a positive “substitution” effect that encourages work until age 65; after 
age 65, it has both an income effect (via the increase in Social Security wealth) 
that discourages continued work and a “substitution effect” that rewards work 
(via higher Social Security beneﬁ  t accruals). Before age 65, their study shows that 
raising the Delayed Retirement Credit from 5 percent to 8 percent would increase 
labor force participation at age 65 by four percentage points. 
26. Some researchers (see Eschtruth and Gemus 2002; Cahill, Giandrea, and 
Quinn 2006) suggest that those workers covered by deﬁ  ned contribution plans 
are sensitive to ﬂ  uctuations in the stock market, and that the 2001 collapse of 
the stock market might explain why the labor force participation rate for older 
workers (aged 55–64 years) jumped 2 percentage points between early 2000 and 
2002. This was an unprecedented increase that occurred during a recession, when 
labor force participation usually declines. This result would be consistent with 
studies by Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) and Coronado and Perozek (2003), 
which found that the unexpected positive shocks to wealth as a result of the stock 
market boom of the 1990s led to some additional retirement. Other researchers 
(Coile and Levine 2006) argue that few households had substantial stock hold-
ings in this same period, and if workers were indeed so sensitive to stock market 
ﬂ  uctuations, their labor force participation should have dropped as the market 
recovered, a decrease which did not happen. 
27. In cash-balance plans, as in traditional deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans, the employer 
makes the contributions, owns the assets, selects the investments, and bears the 
risk. The Pension Beneﬁ  t Guaranty Corporation also insures the beneﬁ  ts. To the 
employee, however, cash balance plans look very much like deﬁ  ned contribution 
plans. The employer typically contributes 4 or 5 percent of the worker’s pay to a 
“notional” account, and provides an interest credit on the balances. Employees 
receive regular statements and generally withdraw the balance as a lump sum 
when they retire or terminate employment. Since these plans are not backloaded, 
employees suffer no loss in beneﬁ  ts as they move from job to job, and therefore 
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these plans would not be expected to affect worker mobility. Bank of America 
created the ﬁ  rst cash balance plan in 1985, and by 2003 these plans covered 22 
percent of all U.S. employees and 26 percent of all assets in deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans 
(see Buessing and Soto 2006). Since 2003, extensive litigation has brought the 
expansion of cash balance plans to a virtual halt. However, the Pension Protec-
tion Act of 2006 clariﬁ  ed the legality of converting deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans to cash 
balance form, and this might prompt renewed interest among employers in con-
verting deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t plans to cash balance plans. 
28.  Coronado and Copeland (2003) offer another perspective on the reasons for 
the shift to cash balance plans. They contend that these conversions occurred in 
competitive industries with tight labor markets, and were done largely to improve 
compensation for a more mobile workforce. 
29. Massachusetts  Ofﬁ  ce of the Governor (2001).
30.  The share of men aged 55 to 60 years in a job that requires “lots of physical 
effort none or almost none of the time” increased from 31 percent to 38 percent 
between 1992 and 2002 (see Johnson 2004a). 
31. Blau (1998), using the Retirement History Survey, found that among 30 to 
40 percent of married couples, the spouses left the labor force within a year of 
each other. Hurd (1990), using the Social Security Administration’s New Beneﬁ  t 
Survey, estimated that among one-quarter of couples, the husband and wives 
retired within one year of each other. Johnson and Favreault (2001), looking at 
married couples in the 1998 wave of the Health and Retirement Study, calculated 
that between 22 and 40 percent of husbands and wives retired within two years 
of each other. These studies show that spouses tend to retire at the same time, 
generally because they want to spend time together. See also Johnson (2004b). 
32. Indeed, a recent study (Lahey, Kim, and Newman, 2006) found that retir-
ees who returned to work were no less ﬁ  nancially prepared for retirement than 
were their counterparts who remained retired. Instead, the inﬂ  uential factors 
for returning to work were the availability of health insurance, whether or not 
the initial retirement decision was voluntary, and the degree of satisfaction with 
retirement. Maestas (2005), using the Health and Retirement Study, also con-
cluded that ﬁ  nancial pressures were not the reason for “un-retirement.” 
33.  A recent study (Mermin, Johnson and Murphy 2006), using the Health and 
Retirement Study, reported a signiﬁ  cant 4 percentage point increase between 
1992 and 2004 in the expected probability among workers aged 51 to 56 years 
staying employed full-time past age 62, from 47 to 51 percent, and a similar 
increase in the probability of staying employed full-time past 65, from 27 to 
33 percent. Controlling for other factors, self-employment, more education, and 
previous higher earnings increased work expectations, while deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pen-
sion coverage, employer-sponsored retiree health beneﬁ  ts, and household wealth 
reduced expectations that older adults would remain in the workforce. 
34. Costa (1998) cautioned researchers not to put too much emphasis on the 
recent uptick in labor force participation of older workers. As long as retirement The Labor Supply of Older Americans 130
remains an attractive option and incomes continue to rise, people will want to use 
at least some of their increased wealth for retirement. The question is whether—
even if income during people’s working years continues to rise—the prospective 
decline in retirement income could provide the impetus for continued work. 
35. The Current Population Survey (CPS) has asked respondents about job 
tenure since 1973. Speciﬁ  cally, CPS tenure supplements are available for 1973, 
1978, 1981, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004. All data are 
from the Workplace Topics I (January/February) supplements, although the 1973 
tenure data are from the displaced worker supplement. The job tenure ques-
tion changes slightly over the period. In 1973, 1978, and 1981, the question 
refers to time spent working at the present job or business, while for 1983 and 
later the question refers to working “continuously” for the respondent’s present 
employer. If respondents in the earlier surveys experienced temporary separations 
from their employer, their responses will make them look like they have more job 
tenure than they actually had. Since other researchers do not view this as a signiﬁ  -
cant problem and make no adjustment, the raw median tenure data for employed 
males are presented in Figure 3.11.
36. See Allen, Clark, and McDermed (1988). Gustman and Steinmeier (1993) 
emphasize how small pension wealth is early in a worker’s career, and argue that 
the main impact of deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pensions would be to deter mobility for long-
tenured workers. 
37. Speciﬁ  cally, for each survey it is possible to identify those working full-time 
at age 55, 60, and so on who are still with the same employer they worked for 
at age 50. Mechanically, this exercise involves simply asking, say, the 55-year-old 
full-time worker, how long he has been with his current employer. If the response 
is ﬁ  ve years or more, the worker is classiﬁ  ed as working with his age-50 employer. 
The number working for their age-50 employer are then divided by total workers 
in these age groups to get the proportion in what used to be the typical pattern of 
employment for older workers.
38.  The survey asks workers whether they lost their job for one of the following 
reasons: their plant or company closed down or moved; their company had insuf-
ﬁ  cient work; their position or shift was eliminated; a seasonal job was completed; 
a self-operated business failed; other reason. These data do not include all job 
losses within the economy, because the survey collects and reports information 
on only one job loss for each individual and the distinction between layoffs and 
voluntary quits is not always clear. Nevertheless, this survey can be used to deter-
mine whether older workers are becoming more or less vulnerable to involuntary 
job displacement.
39. The analysis is limited to displacement because of plant closures, positions 
abolished, or slack demand for work. Using a more detailed set of 56 industry 
dummy variables instead of the set of private goods sector, private service sector, 
and public sector dummy variables had little effect on the coefﬁ  cient estimates 
and standard errors for all other explanatory variables in the regressions.
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40. As in earlier studies, women, married people, and those working full time 
have a low probability of being displaced, and race appears to have no impact 
on this probability. Private sector workers in goods-producing industries have a 
higher probability of being displaced than those in private sector service indus-
tries. In contrast, public sector employees have a much lower likelihood of being 
displaced than their private sector counterparts. 
41.  Over the 1996-2004 Displaced Worker Surveys, displacement rates averaged 
15.9 percent for those workers with 0–1 years of tenure; 11.3 percent with those 
with 1–4 years; 5.5 percent for those with 5–9 years; and 4.0 percent for those 
with 10 or more years of tenure. 
42.  A study by Freeman (1979) reached similar conclusions. 
43.  Benitez-Silva (2002) explores the factors that lead older workers to engage in 
job search activities. The author ﬁ  nds that previous work attachment and health 
limitations are key factors in explaining the different job search behavior of both 
non-employed and employed individuals. 
44.  Reﬂ  ecting this heterogeneity, a recent survey by Vanguard identiﬁ  ed six different 
pathways to retirement. See Ameriks, Fergusson, Madamba, and Utkus (2007).
45.  For a survey of the literature, see Currie and Madrian (1999); an update can 
be found in Deschryvere (2005).
46. See Freedman et al. (2004). The ﬁ   ve surveys included the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS), the Medicare Current Beneﬁ  ciary Survey (MCBS), the 
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), the National Long Term Care Survey 
(NLTCS), and the Supplements on Aging (SOAs). 
47. The NHIS is an annual cross-sectional survey of 100,000 non-institutional-
ized civilians conducted by the National Center for Health Statistics. Unfortu-
nately, the survey questions have been revised every 10 to 15 years, making it 
impossible to construct a series over a long period of time. Nevertheless, con-
sistent data are available from 1967–1982, 1983–1996, and 1997–2004. For the 
period 1983–1996, the survey asked “Does any impairment or health problem 
now keep [the person] from working at a job or business? Is [the person] limited 
in the kind or amount of work [the per  son] can do because of any impairment?” 
A person who answers “yes” to either question is considered to have a disability 
that poses a work limitation.
48.  See Waidmann, Bound, and Schoenbaum (1995). 
49. More speciﬁ  cally,  beneﬁ   ts are reduced by ﬁ   ve-ninths of one percent for 
each month these are received prior to the Full Retirement Age (FRA), up to 
36 months, and ﬁ  ve-twelfths of one percent for each month thereafter. This is 
equivalent to a 6.67 percent reduction for the ﬁ  rst three years prior to the FRA 
and 5 percent thereafter. With an FRA of age 65, a person who claims beneﬁ  ts 
at 62 years receives monthly beneﬁ  ts 20 percent lower than the full amount. The 
scheduled increase in the FRA from age 65 to 67 raises the actuarial reduction for 
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50. The average retirement age is deﬁ  ned as the age at which 50 percent of the 
birth-year cohort is out of the labor force.
51. The increase began with individuals born in 1938, for whom the FRA is 65 
years plus two months, and increases two months per year until it reaches 66 
years. Then, after a 12-year hiatus, the FRA again increases by two months per 
year until it reaches 67 years for individuals born in 1960 or later. 
52.  Studies showing that the availability of beneﬁ  ts has the major effect on retire-
ment include Burtless and Mofﬁ  tt (1984), Hurd (1990), and Gruber and Wise 
(1998). In a study of 12 countries, Gruber and Wise (2002) conclude that averag-
ing across all countries, a reform that delayed the beneﬁ  t eligibility by three years 
would likely reduce the proportion of men aged 56–65 years staying out of the 
labor force by 23 and would be closer to 36 percent in the long run.
53.  However, an increase in the EEA could help set the stage for future increases 
in the full retirement age, one option for maintaining the solvency of the 
Social Security program. An EEA of 62 years makes any additional increase in the 
FRA highly unlikely, since a higher FRA would produce an even steeper reduc-
tion in beneﬁ  ts at age 62. A higher EEA, by signaling that retiring in one’s early 
60s is no longer economically feasible, could prepare the way to raise the FRA 
beyond age 67.
54.  Similarly, a recent survey by Prudential Financial of a nationally representa-
tive sample of retired Americans found that 38 percent of them claimed that they 
had retired involuntarily. 
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Comments on “The Labor Supply of Older 
American Men” by Alicia H. Munnell and 
Steven A. Sass
Robert Hutchens
The paper by Alicia Munnell and Steven Sass seeks to ﬁ  rst examine trends 
in labor force activity of older men in the United States, and then inquire 
into the economic forces that shape those trends. Of particular interest 
is whether the recent increase in the labor force activity of older men is 
likely to continue into the future. 
There are at least two important reasons why we need to understand 
these trends. First, these trends are likely to inﬂ  uence government tax and 
transfer policies toward older Americans over the next several years. To 
illustrate the stakes, consider two scenarios. 
Scenario A: Despite reductions in real Social Security beneﬁ  ts, older 
Americans can easily ﬁ  nd jobs and replace any lost Social Security 
income with wage and salary income. Reduced Social Security beneﬁ  ts 
cause no increased hardship beyond foregone leisure time. 
Scenario B: Many older Americans are unable to ﬁ  nd jobs or are physi-
cally incapable of working. A reduction in real Social Security beneﬁ  ts 
casts large numbers of older Americans into poverty. 
If scenario A is closer to the truth than scenario B, then arguably it would 
be easier to solve the Social Security ﬁ  nancing problem by reducing Social 
Security retirement beneﬁ  ts—for example, by eliminating the age 62 early 
retirement beneﬁ  t. As such, it is important that we understand how easily 
older Americans can increase their labor supply. 
A second reason why the issues addressed in this paper are important 
concerns the quantity and quality of labor that will be supplied to the U.S. 
economy in the future. Over the next two or three decades, the baby boom 
generation will withdraw from the labor force, and they will be replaced The Labor Supply of Older Americans 140
by comparatively small cohorts of young workers. At the same time, we 
are likely to see continued demand for skilled workers. This is at least 
part of the reason for the increased real wages at the upper deciles of the 
earnings distribution over the last three decades. An interesting question is 
whether older workers will help shore up the supply of skilled workers. 
Munnell and Sass begin by noting that for American males over age 55 
years, there has been a century-long decline in labor force activity, shown 
as Figure 3.8 in the paper. In a sense that decline is surprising. Over the 
twentieth century both life expectancy and health levels have arguably 
improved; one would think that with longer and healthier lives we would 
spend more time in the labor market. Of course, the explanation is that 
the wealth of the nation has continued to grow. That trend, combined 
with the availability of retirement income in the form of Social Secu-
rity beneﬁ  ts and employer-provided pension plans, has made it possible 
for older people to withdraw from the labor force. But now comes the 
real surprise: despite our growing wealth, since the mid-1980s, the trend 
toward decreasing labor force activity has turned around and started 
going the other way. This is illustrated in Figures 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10 in 
Munnell and Sass’s paper. 
The paper does a nice job of discussing several explanations for this 
turnaround. It gives, however, special prominence to changes in employer-
provided pensions (the well-documented steady decline in deﬁ  ned ben-
eﬁ  t plans and the rise of deﬁ  ned contribution pensions), and in Social 
Security, particularly, the partial elimination of the earnings test and the 
increase in the delayed retirement credit. 
The paper also discusses several other labor market phenomena that 
occurred at roughly the same time as the turnaround in labor force par-
ticipation; in particular: 
1. A decline in median job tenure at older ages (see their Figures 3.12 
and 3.13). 
2. An increase in job displacements (roughly speaking, job losses other 
than voluntary quits) at older ages (see Figures 3.15 and 3.16). 
3.  A hypothesized decline in the compensation of older workers
4.  Improved health and greater longevity of the older population. 
The bottom line is that Munnell and Sass expect labor force participa-
tion of older men to continue to increase (Figure 3.27). They forecast 
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this in large part because of the predicted contractions in the retirement 
income system. They quite cogently argue that under current law, Social 
Security replacement rates will fall over the next few decades, while 
employer-provided pensions are unlikely to offer a sufﬁ  cient alternative 
source of income. Thus, Munnell and Sass predict that more older people 
will be working in order to augment a meager retirement income from 
pensions and Social Security. 
I like this paper for several reasons. First, it takes a long-run perspective. 
This view is very useful in that it helps make clear that the turnaround 
in older male labor force participation in the 1980s is not particularly 
important in terms of its magnitude. Rather it is important because we 
have not seen anything like this in more than a century. This ﬁ  nding helps 
focus attention on the forces underlying the turnaround. 
Second, I like the authors’ agnostic view of what caused the turn-
around. They give us several possible explanations, and choose their 
preferred explanation, changes in Social Security and pension plans. But 
they also make clear that the literature is not at the point where we can 
conﬁ  dently say what actually caused the turnaround in the labor force 
participation of older American men.
Third, I like the way the paper brings together several different trends: 
in particular, employment trends, trends in job tenure, trends in displace-
ment, and trends in health. There is an interesting breadth to the paper. 
Finally, I like all the footnotes. We get 54 footnotes in 27 pages, and 
these are well worth spending time on. There are lots of interesting points 
about data and what—at least to me—are rather obscure nooks and cran-
nies in the literature. 
Let me raise two questions that struck me in reading the paper. 
First, what types of older men have been increasing their labor force par-
ticipation, and what types are particularly likely to do so in the future? 
I wish the paper said more about the skill level of the groups that 
have played a major role in the post-1985 reversal in the labor force 
participation trends. For example, what does Figure 3.9 look like when 
drawn for college graduates? What about men who never went beyond a 
high school education? Do we see the same turnaround for different skill 
groups? It would be especially nice to do this analysis by deciles in the 
earnings distribution. But an analysis of labor force participation trends 
by educational category should give us the basic facts. The Labor Supply of Older Americans 142
In particular, it would be interesting if the turnaround was occurring 
among men with at least a four-year college degree. Given the rapid rise 
in educational attainment of older cohorts, that would suggest a rap-
idly increasing relative demand for well-educated older workers. Perhaps 
such workers are presently helping to address a vital labor supply need 
in the U.S. economy?
The point is arguably more important regarding how these trends may 
play out in the future. Are the predicted increases in Figure 3.27 different 
by skill level? If the driving force behind the predicted increase in labor 
force participation is a contracting retirement system, meaning reduc-
tions in Social Security beneﬁ  ts and employer-provided pensions, then 
does that imply particularly large increases in labor force participation 
at lower skill and wage levels? The answer will be important because it 
is related to the future quality of the labor force. Looking at trends in 
the U.S. earnings distribution, I see little reason to think that the United 
States needs more low-skilled workers. Moreover, this goes back to the 
issue of hardship in retirement. If low-skilled older people increase their 
labor supply, how much can they earn to augment their income and 
retirement savings? Are we perhaps talking about older people who will 
join the ranks of the working poor? 
My second question is, how will employers respond to increased labor 
force participation of older people? 
It is not hard to believe that if the supply of older workers expands, 
then most will ﬁ  nd jobs. Demand curves slope downward, wages adjust, 
and in the long run most older people who seek work will be able to ﬁ  nd 
it. To my mind, the puzzle concerns the kind of jobs those older people 
will end up doing. In particular, there are two ways that this expan-
sion in supply can occur. First, older people can delay taking retirement 
while remaining in a long-term career job. Second, they can leave those 
long-term jobs and take new jobs—presumably short-term “spot mar-
ket” jobs. As a group of people from a Federal Reserve Bank can well 
understand, some expansions are better than others. From a social point 
of view, I would argue that the ﬁ  rst type of expansion is better. If your 
long-term job was the highest and best use of your labor when you were 
50, then that will probably still be the case at age 60 or 70. A person is 
probably more productive by continuing in that job than in taking a new 
job. Moreover, by staying in the long-term job, speciﬁ  c human capital is 
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preserved as are professional and personal friendship and social support 
networks. Finally, by staying in the long-term job, the person is staying 
out of the market for new jobs; a growing literature indicates that older 
workers can have real difﬁ  culty ﬁ  nding new jobs that match their skill 
sets. 
Of course, it will not always be the case that staying in the long-term job 
is desirable or even possible. My point is only that to the extent that both 
employers and employees beneﬁ  t from workers continuing in the long-
term career job, then from a social point of view that is a good thing. 
There are many ways that an older worker could delay retirement 
while remaining in a long-term career job. Suppose the person prefers to 
cut back on hours. In that case, it is not necessary to change employers. 
Rather, a phased retirement could be arranged whereby the worker stays 
with the current employer but shifts to shorter hours. Another example is 
something like a job bank – whereby retirees are called back during peri-
ods of peak demand. Frito-Lay has done this with delivery truck drivers. 
All indications are, however, that such arrangements are quite rare.1 
Is the predicted expansion in employment of older workers likely to 
take the form of delayed retirement while staying with the long-term 
career job? This paper provides good reason for doubt that the trend 
will play out in this manner. Looking at the older male labor market 
after 1980, what we learn is that (a) the fraction of men who remain in 
the jobs they held at age 50 decreased much more rapidly today than in 
the 1980s; see Figure 3.13. Moreover, (b) that change is partly because 
of a higher probability of displacement today than in the 1980s. Finally, 
(c) it is likely that this increase in job mobility is associated with reduced 
compensation for older workers. These reasons do not describe a labor 
market where people are delaying retirement by staying longer in a well-
established career job. 
I think this issue could be nailed down a bit more. As indicated in their 
Figure 3.13, one can compute the number of workers who are aged 50 years
and over and who have remained at the same ﬁ  rm/employer since age 50. 
The authors do this for 1983 and 2004, but it could be done for the several 
years in which the Current Population Survey collected data on job tenure. 
Thus, one could create a version of Figure 3.9 that plots through time the 
fraction of men aged 55–64 years and aged 65 years and over who are both 
in the labor force and who have not changed employers since age 50. The Labor Supply of Older Americans 144
Now, suppose that this new version of Figure 3.9 indicates that since 
1990 there has been an increase in the fraction of men who are both in 
the labor force and have not changed employers since 1990. To my mind, 
that would be good news. It would mean that the post-1990 expansion 
in the older male labor force is occurring in a way that preserves speciﬁ  c 
human capital and social networks. This would indicate that people are 
tending to remain in the job that was the highest and best use of their 
labor when they were 50-years-old. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that there has been a post-1990 decline in 
the fraction of older men who are both in the labor force and in the job 
they held at age 50. Given the evidence in this paper, I suspect that this 
scenario is what is taking place. I would view conﬁ  rmation of this devel-
opment as not particularly good news. While it is good for the economy 
to have older people working more, the expansion may well be occurring 
in a way that tends to not preserve speciﬁ  c human capital. Older workers 
are arguably moving into jobs that do not make full-use of their skills. 
To conclude, I think Munnell and Sass have written a very interest-
ing paper. It provides a useful perspective on several important trends in 
the labor market for older workers. It also continues a line of work that 
opens up lines of future research on the labor market for older workers. 
Well done. 
Note
1. The Frito-Lay case is in Watson Wyatt Worldwide (2001). See Hutchens 
(2007) for a discussion of phased retirement. 
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Comments on “The Labor Supply of Older 
American Men” by Alicia H. Munnell and 
Steven A. Sass
Joyce Manchester
The paper by Alicia Munnell and Steven Sass makes the case that it is 
sensible for Americans to work longer in the future in order to enhance 
their retirement income security. Working longer also would be good for 
national output and tax revenues. The paper then asks the following ques-
tion: based on what we know now, does it seem likely that American men 
will choose to work longer? Three current impediments to encouraging 
such a trend are identiﬁ  ed as: 1) the early eligibility age for Social Security 
beneﬁ  ts that remains at age 62, 2) the increased mobility of workers that 
exposes them to the vagaries of the labor market, and 3) the signiﬁ  cant 
fraction of people who are not healthy enough to work beyond age 62.
Of course, raising the early eligibility age for Social Security beneﬁ  ts 
seems like an obvious ﬁ  x to some observers. But eliminating old-age ben-
eﬁ  ts at 62 could lead to severe hardship for those not able to work in 
their early 60s, those without other sources of income, or those unlikely 
to live much longer. But instead of dwelling on these objections, my com-
ments will focus on two other considerations of the question regarding 
whether Americans will indeed choose to work longer. The ﬁ  rst consider-
ation concerns the decision of when to claim old-age Social Security ben-
eﬁ  ts. Speciﬁ  cally, what do we know about workers who choose to claim 
old-age Social Security beneﬁ  ts earlier compared with those who claim 
beneﬁ  ts later? A related issue is how recent policy changes have inﬂ  u-
enced the age at which people claim beneﬁ  ts, and whether those trends 
can help us predict future behavior. A second consideration regarding the 
issue of working longer involves the labor force behavior of women. At 
the same time that men are working less at older ages than they did in the The Labor Supply of Older Americans 146
1960s, women’s labor force participation has increased signiﬁ  cantly. Can 
we say something about how their greater work experience and earnings 
will contribute to household retirement incomes in the future?
The Decision to Claim Old-Age Social Security Beneﬁ  ts
A recent analysis of data from the Social Security Administration (SSA) on 
the age at which people claim Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) 
beneﬁ  ts, using a 1 percent sample of administrative records, shows that:
• The most popular age to claim beneﬁ  ts is 62. For example, among all 
OASI beneﬁ  ciaries who claimed beneﬁ  ts at ages 60 through 72 years in 
2003, approximately 47 percent became entitled at age 62. The percent-
age is higher among women, 49 percent, than among men, 44 percent of 
whom claimed Social Security beneﬁ  ts at age 62.
• Approximately 26 percent of people who claimed beneﬁ  ts in 2003 
were 65-years-old; at 31 percent, the percentage was higher among men 
than the 21 percent for women.
What do we know about people who claim old-age beneﬁ  ts  early 
(starting at age 62 and prior to age 65) compared with those who claim 
beneﬁ  ts at age 65 or later? Preliminary analysis of a 1 percent sample 
of SSA data shows that work and earnings activities around the time of 
claiming vary by the claimant’s age. More speciﬁ  cally, people who claim 
beneﬁ  ts at age 65 or later have stronger and steadier labor force activity 
than those who claim at age 64 or earlier. For example, the work partici-
pation rate up to 10 years prior to beneﬁ  t claim and three years following 
beneﬁ  t claim appears to be lower among those who claim beneﬁ  ts at age 
62 than among those who claim beneﬁ  ts at 65; see Figure 3.28. In addi-
tion, the average annual earnings of people who claim beneﬁ  ts between 
ages 62 and 64 are lower than the average earnings of those who claim 
at age 65 or later. The difference can be seen as much as 15 years prior to 
beneﬁ  t claiming as well as three years following beneﬁ  t claiming; please 
refer to Figure 3.29. Given the different work and earnings experience 
of early claimants relative to late claimants, one could speculate that 
more emphasis on job characteristics such as ﬂ  exible schedules, part-time 
work, and help transitioning to jobs that are not physically demanding 
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could be important in encouraging older workers to remain in the labor 
force.
Why do so many people claim old-age beneﬁ  ts at age 62? Multiple 
reasons explain the phenomenon, but two factors that have gained atten-
tion recently are the advice commonly found in newspapers and other 
media, and the effective tax rate on work at older ages. Financial advisors 
sometimes adopt a “one-size-ﬁ  ts-all” attitude that for many individuals 
may not be the correct advice. For example, here is the punch line from 
one recent newspaper column: “When you turn 62, take the money and 
run.” Unless an individual expects to die sooner than the average person 
in his/her cohort, that advice is usually wrong. Taking beneﬁ  ts early gen-
Figure 3.28 
Labor Force Participation by Years Relative to Benefit Claim, By Claiming Age 
of Individuals Who Became Eligible for Entitlement in 1999 and 2000
Source: Tabulations by the Office of Policy, U.S. Social Security Administration, 
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erally means that person, and any dependents who receive Social Security 
beneﬁ  ts based on his or her earnings record, will receive lower beneﬁ  ts 
throughout their lifetimes. The reduction in beneﬁ  ts gets larger as the full 
retirement age (FRA) rises. Until 2003, the FRA was at 65 years, and a 
person who claimed beneﬁ  ts at age 62 received 80 percent of his or her 
full beneﬁ  ts. But when the FRA reaches 67 years in 2022 for individuals 
born in 1960 or later, the person who claims at age 62 will receive just 
70 percent of the full beneﬁ  t amount. Reductions also affect the widow 
beneﬁ  t to some extent.
A second factor that may explain why so many people claim beneﬁ  ts 
at age 62 is the effective tax rate on work at older ages. Recent research 
shows that, for many people, work at older ages does not enhance their 
Figure 3.29 
Mean Annual Earnings by Years Relative to Benefit Claim, by Claiming Age of 
Individuals Who Became Eligible for Entitlement in 1999 and 2000
Source: Tabulations by the Office of Policy, U.S. Social Security Administration, 
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Social Security beneﬁ  t. A study done in the Ofﬁ  ce of Policy at the SSA 
using MINT, a microsimulation model developed by the SSA and the 
Urban Institute, examines the marginal internal rate of return (IRR) on 
Social Security payroll taxes from working one extra year at the end of 
one’s work life (Reznik, Weaver, and Biggs 2007). The results show that 
30 percent of men aged 62–65 years in 2005 would have faced a pure tax 
from working one extra year, meaning that their additional Social Secu-
rity taxes paid would not lead to additional beneﬁ  ts. Only 21 percent 
of men gain from spending an extra year in the labor force at the end 
of their working lives.1 Women have somewhat lower marginal internal 
rates of return than men because many women receive auxiliary beneﬁ  ts 
based on their spouses’ earnings, or have relatively ﬂ  at earnings histories. 
But women are somewhat less likely than men to show up as “pure tax” 
cases because they are more likely to have spotty work histories with 
years in which they have no earnings. It is still true, however, that the 
Social Security payroll tax represents a pure tax for 23 percent of women, 
meaning that 23 percent of women would see no increase in beneﬁ  ts if 
they worked an additional year. Policies that increase the payoff to work 
at older ages could encourage more Americans, particularly men, to stay 
in the workforce longer.
 Do we have any evidence that raising the FRA affects the proportion 
of people who claim beneﬁ  ts early? The answer is yes. Again using a 1 
percent sample of SSA administrative data, a couple of recent papers 
examine changes in the age at which people claim Social Security retire-
ment beneﬁ  ts in response to two recent rule changes: the removal, in 
2000, of the retirement earnings test at ages 65 to 69, and the gradual 
increase in the full retirement age (FRA), also beginning in 2000 for 
people who turned 62 in that year (Song and Manchester 2007, 2008). 
Figure 3.30 shows the cumulative distribution of beneﬁ  t entitlement ages 
for males and females born in 1930, 1937, and 1940 who claim beneﬁ  ts 
between 62 and 65 years and 6 months.2 The distribution of entitlement 
ages of the 1930 birth cohort should be relatively unaffected by both 
rule changes. For the 1937 birth cohort, beneﬁ  t claiming at ages 63 and 
above took place after the elimination of the earnings test in 2000. Con-
sequently, some members of the 1937 birth cohort clearly delayed claim-
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Figure 3.30 
Cumulative Distribution of Benefit Entitlement Ages of Men and Women in 
Selected Birth-Year Cohorts Who Claimed Benefits Between the Ages of 62 
Years and 65.5 Years
Source: Song and Manchester (2007).
Note: The cumulative percentages are measured among those who become 
entitled by age 65 and 6 months.
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Further, the elimination of the earnings test in 2000 appears to acceler-
ate beneﬁ  t claims at age 65, as seen in the vertical distance at 65 years 
between the curves of the 1930 and 1937 birth cohorts. The 1940 cohort 
delayed claiming somewhat between 62 and 65 years, but the most 
noticeable change appears between 65 years and 65 years and 6 months. 
For the 1940 cohort, full Social Security beneﬁ  ts were not available until 
age 65 and 6 months, and Figure 3.30 shows that effect clearly. Women 
show similar, but less pronounced, responses. 
It is a difﬁ  cult task to sort out the economic effects of the beneﬁ  t reduc-
tions from the signaling or institutional role of the FRA, but Figure 3.31 
may offer some clues. The plots show the proportion of men and women 
who became entitled to retirement beneﬁ  ts, using two-month intervals 
between ages 62 and 65 years and 6 months among the cohorts born 
in 1937 through 1940. Among the 1937 birth cohort, which was not 
affected by the increase in the full retirement age to 65, about 42 percent 
of men and 49 percent of women claimed beneﬁ  ts at age 62, the earliest 
retirement age for this cohort. These percentages dropped slightly fol-
lowing the increase in the FRA; in the 1940 cohort, about 40 percent 
of men and 45 percent of women claimed beneﬁ  ts at age 62, the earliest 
eligibility age. The percentage of people who claim beneﬁ  ts after age 62 
and up to a few months prior to the FRA stays relatively stable at about 1 
percent at each two-month age increment. Beneﬁ  t reductions alone affect 
people who retire prior to age 65, so the drop in the percentage who 
claim prior to age 65 largely reﬂ  ects that beneﬁ  t reduction.
More dramatic changes are evident at ages 65 years and above. About 
18 percent of men in the 1937 cohort and 12 percent of women claimed 
beneﬁ  ts at age 65, the FRA for that cohort. As the FRA moved out by 
two months per year for the 1938, 1939, and 1940 cohorts, the spike at 
the FRA moved out as well. In the 1940 cohort, about 16 percent of men 
and 10 percent of women claimed beneﬁ  ts at 65 years and 6 months, 
the relevant FRA for that cohort. People who previously would have 
claimed beneﬁ  ts at age 65 but waited until their new, higher FRA are 
likely responding to a combination of the beneﬁ  t reduction and the sig-
naling aspect of the Social Security retirement age. It is also possible that 
the “full” retirement age in integrated private pension plans inﬂ  uences 
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Figure 3.31 
Entitlement Age Frequency Distribution by Birth-Year Cohort
Source: Song and Manchester (2007).
Note: The cumulative percentages are measured among those who become 
entitled by age 65 and 6 months.
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Song and Manchester also conducted regression analysis of beneﬁ  t enti-
tlement status at speciﬁ  c ages using year- and age-speciﬁ  c treatment dum-
mies over the period 2000–2005. Speciﬁ  cally, results show the marginal 
effects on the probability of entitlement claims given the elimination of 
the retirement earnings test for ages 65 to 69 and the increase in the FRA, 
separately for men and women. Both the direction and the magnitude of 
the estimated effects accord with our expectations. For those aged 65 years 
in 2000–2002, the change in the earnings test rule increases men’s beneﬁ  t 
claims by slightly more than 3 percentage points, and women’s claims by 
slightly more than 2 percentage points. The FRA becomes the dominant 
rule change in 2004 and 2005, however, as the estimated marginal effect 
for those aged 65 turns negative; this marginal effect rises to 12.5 percent-
age points for men and 5.4 percentage points for women in 2005. Effects 
on early claimants are evident as well. Following the six-month increase in 
the FRA, beneﬁ  t entitlement rates for men decline by 3.3, 4.4 and 5.2 per-
centage points at ages 62, 63, and 64 years, respectively and 2.1, 3.3, and 
3.5 percentage points for women at these same three respective ages. These 
estimates suggest that a relatively large response occurs at age 62, and 
relatively small but incremental responses at ages 63 and 64. Recogniz-
ing those responses is important for policymakers who question whether 
people younger than the full retirement age would change their behavior; 
these results argue that changing the full retirement age does delay claim-
ing by people who have not yet reached the FRA. 
Elasticity estimates show the percentage change in claiming rates at a 
given age for a 1 percent reduction in beneﬁ  t amount at that age. At 64 
years, derived elasticities range from 1.3 to 1.7 for men and from 0.7 to 
1.1 for women. Elasticities at age 62 are 0.8 to 1.3 for men and 0.7 to 1.2 
for women. Elasticities near 1 indicate that beneﬁ  t reductions do cause 
people to work longer. Looking forward, further beneﬁ  t reductions as the 
FRA rises to 67 years are expected to result in longer work lives.
How Will Women’s Work and Earnings Contribute to Retirement 
Income in the Future?
The Munnell-Sass paper points out that future retirees will face lower 
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deﬁ  ned beneﬁ  t pensions, and contend with the vagaries of a more mobile 
job market. Compared to the 1960s, things look grim. At the same time, 
the authors see little evidence that men will increase their labor force 
participation much at older ages, thus compounding the pessimistic out-
look. Yet there is a large and growing component of the labor force that 
is neglected, albeit intentionally, in the Munnell-Sass paper: women. At 
the same time that men’s labor force participation at ages 55–64 was 
dropping from 87 percent in 1960 to 69 percent in 2005, women’s par-
ticipation rate surged from 37 percent in 1960 to 57 percent in 2005; see 
Figure 3.32. For men ages 65 years and above, participation dropped 
from 33 percent in 1960 to 20 percent in 2005. At the same time, labor 
force participation for women ages 65 years and above stayed approxi-
mately constant at 11 percent. Will women’s increased work and earn-
ings help to maintain American standards of living in retirement? 
Some evidence on the possible contributions of women to household 
retirement income comes from examining married couples who are near-
Figure 3.32 
Labor Force Participation of American Men and Women, Aged 55 to 64 Years, 
and 65 Years and Older, 1960–2050, with Projection to 2050
Source: Author’s calculations of U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics data in
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ing retirement. A paper by Maestas (2001) based on data from the Health 
and Retirement Study reports that 75 percent of men nearing retirement 
age in the 1990s were married, and 40 percent of them had working 
wives. The MINT model also shows that labor force attachment among 
married women is on the rise. According to the MINT model, married 
women in the retiree population of the late 1990s, cohorts which predate 
the baby boom generation born between 1946 and 1964, averaged 18 
years of work experience. This contrasts rather starkly with 29 years 
in the labor force predicted for the early baby boomer women born in 
the 1946–1954 period, and 30 years for the late boomer women born 
between 1955 and 1964. Labor force participation is also projected to 
increase for non-married women. 
More work experience for women translates into a greater likelihood of 
pension coverage for women; health insurance while they are in the labor 
force, and perhaps retiree health insurance as well; and receipt of their 
own Social Security beneﬁ  ts from both Old-Age Insurance and Disability 
Insurance. Tabulations of the Health and Retirement Study show that the 
percentage of women aged 55–64 years who have a pension rose from 52 
percent in 1994 to 63 percent in 2004 (Iams et al. 2007). Social Security 
data show that the percentage of women who receive old-age beneﬁ  ts 
based on their own earnings record rather than from spousal beneﬁ  ts is 
rising as well.3 Over the past two decades, the percentage of women with 
earned worker beneﬁ  ts increased. Current beneﬁ  ciary women aged 62 to 
64 years with retired worker beneﬁ  ts increased from 48 percent in 1984 
to 56 percent in 2004, while those with disabled worker beneﬁ  ts doubled 
from 8 percent to 16 percent.
To conclude, the paper by Munnell and Sass raises a number of impor-
tant issues regarding the labor supply of older American workers in 
the twenty-ﬁ  rst century. But there is reason to be optimistic about their 
prospects, both for continuing in the labor force and for their retirement 
income security, once we examine the evidence to date on how older 
workers have responded to policy changes. Following the increase in the 
full retirement age, we have solid evidence that people are claiming Social 
Security beneﬁ  ts at later ages. We have identiﬁ  ed other factors that could 
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tion, such as job characteristics, the retirement advice and information 
offered, or the incentives in the tax-beneﬁ  t structure of Social Security. 
And the other half of the potential labor force, women, have increased 
their contributions to household retirement incomes in recent decades, 
and a reversal in that trend is unlikely.
 These comments were written while Manchester was with the Ofﬁ  ce 
of Policy, Social Security Administration; she is now at the Congressional 
Budget Ofﬁ  ce. Any ﬁ  ndings or opinions expressed here are those of the 
author and not necessarily those of the Social Security Administration or 
the Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce.
Notes
1. In this exercise, individuals “gain” when the marginal internal rate of return   
is greater than 3 percent in real terms.
2.  We include entitlement ages ranging from 62 to 65 years and 6 months because 
at the time we did the data work, the most recent data came from June 2006. The 
last birth cohort considered here (1940) reaches 65 years and 6 months, the FRA 
for that cohort, by the end of June 2006.
3. A general rule of thumb is that married women receive retired-worker-only 
beneﬁ  ts when their average lifetime earnings are more than 30 percent of their 
husband’s earnings.
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